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CHAPTER I 
STAT~~iliNT OF THE PROBLEM AND COLLECTION 
AND TREATMENT OF DATA 
British East Africa has long been the playground 
of American millionaires , who have shot its wild game, 
drunk whiskey on its lonely plains, marvelled at its 
primitiveness , ignored its poverty , and proudly returned 
home with cartons of trophies . 
East Africa has not been well known in the United 
States , its status as a paradise for hunters notwith-
standing . Americans have been preoccupied with other 
things, and Africa has remained the dark continent for 
them . They recoil in horror when one tells of African 
customs of marriage , puberty, mourning , or medicine . 
Such practices represent , for the average man, the 
epitome of degradation . l 
However, since World War II , Afr ica has emerged 
from its colonial status into full partnership with the 
other nations of the world in all the affairs of mankind . 
"The African is beginning to realize that he is a member 
lHarold Lindsell , Missionary Principles and Practice 
(Westwood , New Jersey : Fleming H. Revell Company , 1965) , 
p . 49 . 
2 
of the new ' one world .' No longer will he accept with grati-
tude anything that is given him . u2 Africa, whether one 
approves or not , is now the partner of other powers in 
international affairs . 
American involvement in Africa is of recent origin, 
principally since \world \iar II : 
• • • there has never been, until the end of 
World War II, an actual policy commitment, a 
systematic , continuous concern with African 
affairs , unless a purely negative , passive 
posture may be aescribed as continuous policy . 3 
East Africa has played a vital role in the total 
effort of Africans to emerge from colonial status to 
that of independence . 
To become conscious of community , define it, and 
assert it, requires a complex development and, in the case 
of Africa, the consent of the great political powers of 
the world . 
I • b'l'A'l'ElviENT OF 'l'HE PROBLFJY1 
Africa, because of the airect interests of nations 
so closely allied with the United ~tates, remained on the 
2H . B. Young, "Black Africa beethes," Christian 
Century, u2:131S- 19 , November 28 , 1945 . 
3Henry 1 . Bretton , "United &tates Foreign Policy 
Toward the Newly lnaependent btates, 11 African Independence 
Peter Judd, editor (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 
1962), p . 445 . 
3 
fringe of diplomatic concern until quite recently. The 
existence, however, of a democratic state, such as the 
United States, with a history of revolution and a tradition 
of resistance to non-democratic methods, served as a stimu-
lant to Africans as they began to emerge into the arena of 
political activity . 4 
Identification of American and African ideals had 
been made about the beginning of this century .5 Further 
identification was encouraged by various people and circum-
stances throughout the years following World War I, espe-
cially in the period just prior to and during World War II . 6 
W. E. B. DuBois and ~arcus Garvey are generally con-
sidered the originators of the modern African national con-
sciousness . Both men were instrumental in awakening the 
Africans to the possibility of national identity and 
self-respect . 
DuBois organized several Pan- African Congresses in 
the years after 1900, the last one being held in London in 
1945 . 7 He represented African aspirations at the Versailles 
4Tom J . Mboya, "Our Revolutionary Tradition: An African 
View," Current History, 31:346, December, 1956. 
5Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, African Nationalism 
in the Twentieth Century {Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 
Incorporated, 1965), p . 21 . 
6Ibid . 7Ibid., p . 25. 
4 
Peace Conference in 1919 .8 Circulating freely throughout 
the world, DuBois encouraged young Africans to assert their 
peculiar identities . 
American documents of state are studded with slogans 
praising the virtues of democracy . Statements of the presi-
dents gave comfort to the aspiring nationalists, especially 
in the years after 1945 . 
The Atlantic Charter was quoted by the London Confer-
ence of African nationalists as evidence that the Western 
Allies would give independence to their colonial peoples. 
Third, they respect the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they 
will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights 
and self- government restored to those who have 
been forcibly deprived of them.9 
President Truman's concern for the East European 
countries evoked statements designed to persuade the 
Russians to give them freedom of choice. Africans under-
stood his statements to be universally applicable and 
insisted that self- determination be granted to themselves 
as well as to Europeans .10 
gibid . 
9winston s . Churchill, ~ Grand Alliance (Vol . III 
of The Second World War . 6 vols . ; Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1951), p . 443. 
l~arry s . Truman, ~-g, Years of Trial and Hope 
{New York : Signet Books, 1930T, pp . 263 ff . 
5 
Ytr. Truman was preoccupied with Europe. His concern 
with Africa was limited to the North , and that he gave no 
credence to the possibility that Black Africa was headed 
for independence is evident. Speaking on foreign policy 
at Navy Day celebrations in 1945, he said: 
We believe that all peoples who are prepared 
for self-government should be permitted to choose 
their own form of government by their own freely 
expressed choice, without interference from any 
foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia 
in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.il 
East ana Central Africa were important to the United 
States for two reasons. First, most of the uranium used in 
atomic enterprises came from the Belgian Congo, as well as 
other strategic metals in Central Africa.12 Second, East 
and Central Africa was to become a staging area for troops 
if tte Russians began to advance southward through the 
~liddle East and the Mediterranean area. 
The first of these made it imperative that the free 
flow of materials be maintained to the Western World . The 
Western nations are dependent upon the mineral resources of 
Central Africa. 
llHarry S. Truman, ~, Year of Decisions (New York: 
Signet Books, 1955), pp. 590-91. 
12Rupert Emerson, "The Character of American Interests 
in Africa," in The United States and Africa, Walter Gold-
schmidt, editor-rNew York:-rreaerick A. Praeger, 1963), p . 5. 
Because of its geographical relationship to 
the highways of the 1v~.edi terrane an, to the Atlan-
tic and Indian Oceans, and to the oil fields of 
the Middle East , Africa would immediately become 
part of the global front line in the event of 
war . If the influence of the West continues to 
deteriorate in Egypt and the Arab areas generally, 
East Africa in particular would be an indispens-
able staging area .13 
6 
The second called for elaborate planning and covert 
operations to prepare for the eventuality of war with 
Russia. Communications were to be established between the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans . Ports had to be made adequate 
for future traffic . Hailways had to be built. Highways 
had to be planned and built, if possible . Air bases had to 
be strategically located in the area to protect the 
installations .l4 
M. s . A. and other loans can be regarded as 
"economic statesmanship" only if the well-being 
of the territories receiving them is considered 
synonymous with the interests of their European 
exploiters . l5 
East Africa was strategically indispensable in plans 
for the defense of the Western Hemisphere . The paper will 
elaborate on these involvements .l6 
l3c . \I . De Kiewiet, "African Dilemmas , " Foreign 
Affairs, 33:445, April, 1955 . 
14Basil Davidson, "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms," 
Nation, 175:209, ~eptember 13, 1952 . 
15Ibid., p . 210 . 
7 
The United States "discovered" Africa in 1952 . In 
that year l•Iau l•iau broke to the surface in Kenya ana began 
it.s blooay career in the news of the world .17 "It was not 
until 1952, indeed, that the African continent as a whole 
thrust itself decisively upon the American counsciousness . n18 
Prior to 1952, little was known of East Africa by most 
Americans . However, 1•lau 1'-fau changea that . The world began 
to know about Kenya . 
In 1958 the ~tate Departffient formed an entirely new 
section for the continent of Africa . Until then the affairs 
of Africa haa been handled through the appropriate European 
section .19 
In the meantime, by its membership on the Trustee-
ship Council of the united Nations, the Unitea States had 
taken the side of the black Africans in Tanganyika, insist-
ing that progress toward self- government be allowed and 
encouraged by the British . 20 
17c . L . ~ulzberger, "I·1au r~Iau," The Ne~ York Times, 
December 28, 1952, page 3 . 
lBRichard P. ~tebbins (ed . ), ~he United States in 
World Affairs, ~ (Ne\'/ York: H~rper and brothers, 1953), 
p . 248 . 
19Bretton, loc . cit . 
20Richard P. Stebbins (ed . ), The United States in 
\~orld Affairs, 1222 (New York: harper and Brothers, 1960), 
p . 2b8 . 
Education became a determining factor in the strug-
gle for independence, as young men began to seize the 
initiative from the reactionary colonials . V~ny African 
students came to the United 5tates to study . They usually 
studied political science and turned their knowledge 
against their colonial rulers . 21 
Also, Americans worked in the educational institu-
tions within the countries . ~lissionaries, especially, 
were active, often carrying the main burden of educating 
the Africans . 22 
The United States has been deeply involved in the 
freedom movement in Africa . The full story of that 
involvement has not yet been told . It is the goal of this 
study to make known the American role in Bast Africa. 
II . DEFINITION OF 'l'B~iS 
Relations . This word is used to mean all those con-
tacts between Americans and Africans of the British sphere 
of East Africa. Usage is not limited to governmental or 
21Tom J . Mboya, Freedom and After (London: Andre 
Deutsch, Limited, 1963), p. 146. 
22Johnni Johnson, What Do ~tissionaries Do? 
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 19b4), p. 12 . 
9 
official relationships . All those relations which have 
affectea , or been affectea by, the development of national-
ism in British East Africa are included . 
Nationalism . Nationalism is used in a broad sense 
to include more than politics . All those feelings of 
community which form the basis of national identity are 
embodied in the term. 
African . The word African is used to distinguish 
between the nationalist tendencies of the black African , 
the Asian , and the ~uropean . All these groups are resident 
in ~ast Africa and nationalistic ties have knitted each 
group to6ether within the larger context . The particular 
concern of the paper is with the development of nationalism 
among the black Africans . 
British ~ast Africa . The area of Africa known as 
British East Africa is composed of the four countries of 
Uganda, Kenya , tanganyika and Zanzibar (1anzania) . 
Since ~. Of primary interest is the tracing of 
relations since the ~econd World War, with 1945 used as 
the generalized date for the end of the war . However , 
certain events antecedent to that year are included because 
they are germane to the discussion . One chapter is given 
to a discussion of the Pan- African development from 1900 
to 1945 . 
10 
III . ORGANIZATION OF THE S'IUDY 
Chapter two is devoted to the development of African 
nationalism from 1900 to 1945, with particular reference to 
its American origins . This chapter deals with the Pan-
African Congresses and the important contributions made 
by W. E. B. DuBois and l•iarcus Garvey . 
Chapter three is given to the development of Ameri-
can attituues toward African nationalism in the years from 
1945 to 1965 . This chapter shows the gradual change of 
attitude from that which leaves the Africans completely in 
the hanus of the colonial powers to that of active partici-
pation in the movement toward independence . 
The following chapters are concerned with topical 
subjects. They include material from the 1945- 65 period, 
but they are developed topically rather than chronologi-
cally. 
A chapter is devoted to a discussion of the relevance 
of American political ideology to the African development . 
The discussion is concerned with American ideals and actual 
involvement of the United States in the political organiza-
tion of the African states . 
Economic matters are given separate treatment . 
That the United States has a vested interest in the 
stability of African states is evident and that this has 
been a motive for activity in Africa is a reasonable 
conclusion. 
11 
~tissionary enterprises have been active in East 
Africa since the nineteenth century . American religious 
groups have been interested chiefly in the last thirty 
years, ana they have been instrumental in the development 
of African national feeling. Their motives are mixed, 
combining Christian zeal with more mundane cultural 
motives . 
Education has played a decisive role in the prepa-
ration of Africans for self-government . Americans have 
played a prominent role in this field . 
A concluding chapter summarizes the American 
interests in East Africa . 
IV. DELIMITATIONS OF TH.i!. S'l'UDY 
This study is concerned with the United States' 
relationship to the development of the awareness of 
national identity among the African population of 
British East Africa . 
The study is not concerned with other nations, 
except as they are incidental to the stated problem . 
12 
V. SOURC~S OF DATA 
Sources for this study include the personal papers 
of the presidents, memoirs of the presidents, policy 
papers of the Department of State, various books which 
analyze the relations of states internationally , newspapers, 
with special reliance on The New York Times, religious and 
secular journals, news magazines, United Nations journals, 
and the unpublished minutes of the Baptist Mission of East 
Africa . 
CHAPTER II 
THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN NATI0NALISM 
August, 1945 brought the end of V.orld 'k'iar II, the 
greatest paroxysm of carnage ever suffered by the nations 
of earth . In the swirling up- draft of the fission bomb, 
the hopes of the Japanese to establish an oriental hegemony 
was brought to an ignominious close, just as Germany had 
been forced to abandon her aream of European domination a 
few months before . 
Those anguishea days could not obscure the stirring 
of Asian nationalism which had been in evidence for many 
years . Out of the post- war adjustments emerged a new 
family of nations . They were Asian nations, primarily, 
with the Arabs also receiving the right of self-government . 
In the midst of the cataclysm another wind was blow-
ing . Years later it would be called "the wind of change . n23 
But , very few men in positions of control could foresee 
Africa's surge toward independence . In 1945, few thought of 
the "dark continent" as potentially able to govern itself . 
Yet, within fifteen years of the ena of •iorld War II, 
nearly all the geographical subdivisions of Africa were 
23nc.hanging Wind, 11 Time, 75:38, F'ebruary 15, 1960 . 
14 
self-governing. Nationalism was at work, and what had 
seemed impossible in 1945 was an actuality in 1960. 
What caused this sudden rush to independence? Had 
Africans, without a history of their own suddenly blossomed 
without benefit of seed-time and growth? Had these backward 
peoples n1erely taken advantage of a momentary pause in the 
all-encompassing domination of Europeans over the rest of 
the world? Was the judgment true, which was made by some, 
that Africans had no historical preparation for self-
government?24 Could the world look to Africans with 
expectations of order and friendly participation in the 
politics of the world?25 
The progress of African countries toward independence 
was not rapid, of course. In fact, the era of colonialism 
was but an interlude in the history of the continent. 
Political organization in Africa was notable and extensive 
in the early part of this millenium, marked by the exist-
ence of the ancient states of Mali , Ghana, Songhai, Bornu, 
and other lesser states. Actually, colonialism was an 
24sir Philip Mitchell, "Africa and the West in His-
torical Perspective," Africa Today , C. Grove Haines, editor 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p . 3. 
25Henry L. Bretton , uunited 8tates Foreign Policy 
Toward the Newly Independent States," African Independence , 
Peter Judd, editor (New York : Dell Publishing Company , 
1962), p. 447. 
15 
interruption of African political organization, rather than 
the beginning.26 
All authorities on Africa acknowledge that t he United 
States was the incubator of modern African nationalism. 
This is recognized by African nationalists themselves . 27 
American Negroes developed an interest in their 
African origins, and this interest grew until it became a 
deep sense of Negro identity . Kohn and Sokolsky point out: 
Carter G. Woodson, founder of the Journal of 
Negro History, was pre- eminent in this absorp:-
tion in the African background, his The African 
Background Outlined being a symbol of the 
aroused interest.28 
Next, in their order of appearance and importance , 
were \l . E. B. DuBois and l•mrcus Garvey . DuBois made his 
entrance at the first Pan-African meeting in 1900 . 29 
Garvey appeared in the 1920's but quickly passed from the 
scene when he was prosecuted for irregularities in his 
affairs . 3° DuBois is generally accepted as the nrather" 
26Donald Weidner, A History of Africa South of the 
Sahara (New York: Vintage Books, 1904), pp . 6 et ~· 
27Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, African 
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van 
Nostrand Compan~l965) , p . 25 . 
28rbid • , p . 22 • 
29Basil Davidson, vfuich Way Africa? (Harmondsworth , 
England: Penguin Books, 1964), p . 61 . 
3~ohn and Sokolsky, loc . cit . 
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of Pan- Africanism although others , too, have played an 
important part in creating an interest in the "African 
personality . n3l 
16 
A series of Pan- African meetings was held following 
the 1900 conclave . Colin Legum lists six of these, begin-
ning with the 1900 meeting and ending with the l".1anchester 
Congress of 1945 . 32 
The Congress of 1900 set the tenor of the meetings 
which followed . Those who organized and directed the meet-
ing were concerned with Negro rights primarily , but those 
rights were irrevocably bound up with their African origins 
and kinship with all living Africans . Basil Davidson points 
out : 
These men looked across to Africa with a 
bitter awareness of their own unity in dis-
franchisement: here in the New \lorld all 
Africans had lost their separate ethnic loyal-
ties, languages , cultures , sense of difference 
from one another; ana so it appeared natural 
to regard all Africans as belonging to the 
same great territorial unit, Africa, however 
much that unit might be divided within itself 
by "the frontiers of foreign rule . n33 
3lrbid ., p . 21 . 
32colin Legum , Pan-Africanism {New York : Frederick A. 
Pr aeger , 1962}, pp . 24- 32 . 
33navidson , loc . cit . 
17 
The first meeting of a Pan-African nature occurred 
just at the turn of the century, when the colonial powers 
were in the process of consolidating their gains on the 
African continent, and when anti- Negro sentiment was at 
i ts height in the United ~tates . The world climate in 
1900 reveals two of the objectives of Pan-Africanism in its 
larger involvements . First, of course, is the objective of 
ejecting the colonial nations from the African lands . 
~econd, and not so obvious, is the universal Negro protest 
against racism, particularly that of the American and West 
Indian Negroes, which remains an aim of Pan-Africanism . 34 
The second of the Pan-African Congresses was held in 
1919 during the Versailles Peace Conference . There, incon-
gruously, DuBois, and others, were engaged in conversations 
with the men who were attempting to re - establish the 
balance of power in Europe, and to make equitable redistri-
bution of African colonies among the victors in World 
War r)5 
Africans at Paris were not subdued, nor were they 
timid in their demands on the colonial powers . Basil 
Davidson makes the follo\V"ing comment: 
34Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, 'l'he Politics of 
Independence (New York : Vintage Books, 1961), p. l05:-
35Kohn and Sokolsky, QE • cit . , p . 25 . 
The delegates boldly addressed themselves to 
the Powers . They called on them to "establish a 
code of law for the international protection of 
the natives of Africa , similar to the proposed 
international code for labour, " and laia down a 
list of "principles" by which "the natives of 
Afri ca and the peoples of Africq.n descent" 
should hencefort h be governed . 3o 
That the gains of the Africans at Paris were unim-
18 
pressive is no surprise, for the Europeans were only begin-
ning to gain control of their African colonies . To consider 
granting them independence was unreasonable to them . Addi-
t ionally, vloodro\'1 \'lilson was not prepared to insist that 
pr ovisions be incorporated in the Peace Treaty, other than 
that the Trusteeship system be set up , whereby colonial 
territories of the Central Powers were mandated to the 
vi ctorious Allies . Yet , the influence of the 1919 Congress 
was important and lasting , and within that Congress, the 
dominating figure was DuBois . As Davidson remarks : 
• • • these demands of the secona congress 
pointed forward to a steady crystallization of 
new ideas . They were Pan- African and they were 
libertarian . Moreover, and the influence of 
DuBois counted for much in this, they gave due 
weight to the customs and beliefs of pre- colonial 
Africa- - to all that complex of tradition which had 
carried Africans through the years before the 
conquest . 3 7 
The demands of the Congress included preservation of 
land , conservation of natural resources , regulation of 
36Davidson , 2£· cit ., p . 62 . 
19 
investment and concessions, abolition of slavery and forced 
labor, education at public expense for all Africans, and 
the speedy grant of political rights.38 However, even the 
radical men of Pan-Africanism recognized a need for prepa-
ration of Africans for governmental participation, and did 
not mention independence.39 
The next two Pan-African Congresses did not accom-
plish much . But, they served the purpose of keeping the 
movement alive and preserving the spirit of African 
identity. The third Congress was held in 1921 and met in 
London, Brussels, and Paris, with forty-one of the delegates 
coming from Africa.4° 
The American character of the movement remained as 
the Congress of 1923 met . "In fact, DuBois acknowledges, 
even after the third Pan-African Congress, held in London 
and Lisbon, in 1923, that the Pan-African idea was still 
American rather than African .u41 
During the twenties 1>'1arcus Garvey made his sweep 
across the Pan- African scene, saying, "'we believe in the 
freedom of Africa for the Negro people of the world • 
• • 
39L . t ')9 egum, .2.£· g_., p . 4 • 
4°Kohn and Sokolsky, .2.£• cit., p . 2b . 
4lrbid. 
20 
we also demand Africa for the Africans at home and 
abroad.rn42 Such precepts, pronounced with all the fer-
vency of an evangelist, fell on responsive ears throughout 
the world. 
Garvey was ambitious and organized various enter-
prises, including the Universal African Legion, an African 
Orthodox Church, and the Black Star Lines . 43 
His parent organization was called the Universal 
Negro Improvement Association, and served as his base of 
operation. Through the official voice of the organization, 
Negro \wrld, Garvey proclaimed the motto of his movement: 
"One God, One Aim, One Destiny .n44 
Garvey's influence upon the nationalist movement in 
Africa was far-reaching . Kwame Nkrumah paid him homage by 
attributing to him many of the basic concepts which he 
held and practiced.45 
His contemporaries were sympathetic, but critical of 
the methods Garvey used to further his goals . J . A. Rogers, 
a close associate of Garvey, makes this observation: 
42~1arcus Garvey, quoted by Kohn and Sokolsky in 
African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 23 . 
43Kohn and Sokolsky, 2£· cit., p. 23. 
44Ibid. 45Ib . . 
----1:£·' p. 
"His cause was just, too, but his methods were 
twisted, archaic, perverse. He undoubtedly wanted 
to help the downtroaden blacks but like every other 
autocrat believed that the end justifies the 
means • • • "4b 
DuBois, dedicated Africanist that he was, criti-
cized Garvey severely for his intemperate propaganda, poor 
finance, demagogic tendencies, and the apprehension he 
aroused among the colonial nations who controlled the 
destiny of the African people .47 
The fourth Pan-African Congress, or fifth in the 
reckoning of Colin Legum, was held in New York in 1927. 
Only a few Africans were present and the Pan- African 
movement was experiencing a decline. Shortly the depres-
sion would strike the world and further efforts would be 
hampered by the lack of funds.48 
However, the cause was not lost. The efforts of 
21 
DuBois and his aides were not to be lost in the pages of 
history, for at the close of World ~ar II the last and most 
important meeting of the Pan-African movement convened 
46J. A. Rogers, quoted by Kohn and Sokolsky in 
African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p . 24 . 
47w. E . B. DuBois, quoted by Kohn ana Sokolsky in 
African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 24 . 
48Kohn and Sokolsky , 2E· cit., p . 27. 
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at i~lanchester, England, a suburb of London, and carried the 
vision of DuBois to fruition. Kohn and Sokolsky agree 
that: 
The Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 was 
far more important than any of its predecessors . 
Again, DuBois was a moving spirit but this time, 
Africans themselves played a major role in the 
proceedings . Two hundred delegates met in 
Manchester, England, October 15-21; prominent 
among them were Dr . P . l·l . l1 illiard, 'f . R. 
l•1akonnen, George Paa.more, Kwame Nkrumah, Peter 
Abrahams, and Jomo Kenyatta . 49 
In the 1930's and 1940's, increasing numbers of 
Africans went abroad to study . 'l'hey suffered misery, 
rejection, loneliness, and alienation , but they persevered, 
keeping the goal of African self-determination always 
before them . Kenyatta studied in Britain . Nkrumah , and 
others, travelled to the United States . Nkrumah, the 
future leader of Ghana organized the African Students' 
Association of America and Canada, which \vas an expression 
of the Pan-Africanist influence from North America . 50 
These men, possessed by a vision of independence 
for their continent, were the moving spirit of 1•ianchester , 
making it the most important of all the Pan- African 
Congresses. Kohn and Sokolsky further point out that: 
50ibid ., p. 22 . 
. • • it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress 
that provided the outlet for African nationalism 
ana brought about the awakening of African politi-
cal consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass 
movement of Africa for the Africans.'l 
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Perhaps the explanation for the energy generated by 
the J.1anchester conference of 1945 is to be found in the 
fact that a majority of those present were African. The 
movement became African rather than American, and it 
became a dynamic movement.52 
Also, the apprehension aroused by the Pan-African 
movement was, no doubt, caused by its distinct orientation 
toward IvJ.a.rxism .53 Colin Legum asserts that: 
For the first time we find the forthright 
challenge: "We demand for Black Africa autonomy 
ana indepenaence, so far, and no further, than 
it is possible in this one worla for groups and 
peoples to rule themselves s~bject to inevitable 
world unity and federation."'4 
The determined men at J.!anchester were no longer call-
ing for justice within the framework of colonialism, but 
for the right to determine their own destinies, in their 
own ways, according to their own traditions, and by their 
own institutions. 
5libid. , p . 2$. 53 Ibid . 
54colin Legum, Pan- Africanism (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1962), p. 32, quoting documents of the 1945 Pan-
African Congress at Manchester , England . 
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The Congress of lv'lanchester set up an organization 
with a permanent secretary and a journal. Although it 
later was to be banned in the colonies, the journal served 
as an expression of the npositive actionn called for by 
the Congress. 11Aided by the world-wide surge of anti-
imperialism , Pan-Africanism entered a new phase--the march 
toward freedom--freedom for individual African countries.n55 
The Manchester Congress cited a document which had 
been prepared several years before its meeting, and which 
was written without thought of the Africans south of the 
Sahara, the Atlantic Charter: 
Bringing its deliberations to a close, it asked 
the colonial powers to honor the Atlantic Charter, 
and ended its plea with, "We are determined to be 
free ••• Therefore, we shall complain , appeal 
and arraign. \',e will make the world listen to the 
facts of our condition. Ue will fight in every way 
we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment.n56 
Particular reference was to the third article of the 
Charter, which said, "They respect the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they will 
live; • • • • n57 
55Kohn and Sokolsky , ££• cit., p. 29. 
5~ohn and Sokolsky , African Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century, p . 28, citing the Atlantic Charter. 
57winston s . Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Vol. III 
of The Second World \'far . 6 vols . ; Boston: Houghton :fv1ifflin 
Company , 1951), p. 443, citing Article III of the Atlantic 
Charter. 
That document, drawn as a proclamation of Anglo-
American unity and for the inspiration of the East Euro-
peans in the depths of war, stirred excitement beyond 
comprehension in the minds of Africans. Albert Luthuli, 
the dean of South African nationalists, makes the follow-
ing statement : 
In the Xuma era (1940-49}, Congress gradually 
began to take on a new character. It began to 
formulate its aims and policy far more clearly 
than hitherto. Inspired by the Atlantic Charter, 
and by a war for human freedom, it drew up a 
precise document called "Africa Claims." 
Young men began to come into t heir own, and the 
Congress Youth League injected new determ~na­
tion and vitality into the organization.58 
\'/hat was true of South Africa was true of the rest 
of Africa. Those men, mostly young men, dedicated to the 
proposition that Africa should detennine its own course, 
took their inspiration from the United ~tates. 
East Africa was an integral part of that movement. 
Kenyatta, the revered leader of nationalism in Kenya, was 
a participant in the ~~nchester Congress. 
An unusual circumstance made nationalism easily 
transmitted in East Africa. A lingua franca, Kiswahili, 
and the rule of Britain over all the political aivisions, 
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58Albert Luthuli, Let Mx People Go (London: Fontana 
Books, 1963}, p . 89 . 
gave the nationalists there a feeling of unity and the 
ability to communicate with one another with a facility 
unknown in much of the continent . 59 
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What had begun in 1900 as the expression of protest 
by American Negroes, culminated in 1960 in the independ-
ence of sixteen African nations . 60 Appropriately, the man 
who seized the opportunity of 1900 t o demand recognition 
of Negro rights , W. E. B. DuBois , lived to see the "great 
year of independence . n61 
The patriarch of African nationalism died on 
August 27 , 1960, a citizen of Ghana , and an avowed 
Communist . He was ninety-five years of age . 62 His con-
tri bution to the nationalist movement of Africa will be 
diffi cult to assess, but it is true, beyond doubt, that 
no one contributed more to the inception and nurture of 
the spirit of Negro self-consciousness than William 
Edward Burghardt DuBois . 
59Kohn and Sokolsky, ££ • cit . , p . 90 . 
60Davidson, ££ • cit ., p . 64 . 
61Ibid . 
62Kohn and Sokolsky, ££• cit . , p. 97 . 
~1oaern African nationalism was begun in the United 
States by Dubois, Garvey and others. Though one may not 
assert that the government of the United States exerted 
much influence, for it manifestly did not encourage the 
movement until the late 1950's, it must be recognized 
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and credited that the original impetus for African national 
consciousness was American--Negro American, which identified 
with all men of color in a struggle for recognition and 
independence. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PROGR~SS OF M~~RICAN POLICY 
I. POST- WAR INTERNA1IGNAL POLITICS 
Nineteen forty-five was the year of triumph for the 
Western Allies. Germany was finally overwhelmed, when she 
would not capitulate unconditionally. Months later, after 
the aevastating introduction of the Atomic Age, Japan also 
was in subjection to the Allied Powers . 
President Truman called 1945 the "year of decisions ."03 
'lhe title was appropriate, for 'lruman assumed the Presidency 
with little knowledge of what had been the substance of 
policy under Roosevelt. He was left with the aecision about 
employing the atomic bomb, ana countless other vexing 
problems. 
One of the most determinative events of the year was 
the conference neld at Potsdam. Here, the new President con-
ferreci with Stalin, Churchill and others . For 'I'ruman, the 
critical element of the conference was the personality of 
Stalin. He remarked after the meeting , "Force is the only 
thing the Russians understanct.n 64 
63Harry ~. 'lruman titled Volume I of his memoirs, 
~, Year of Decisions. 
04Harry ~. Truman, lli.2_, Year of Decisions (Vol. I of 
lv1emoirs. 2 vols.; New York : ~ignet Books, 1955), p. 454. 
The Potsdam Conference had been called because no 
understanding could be reached about Eastern Europe, 
especially Poland.65 Poland became a focal point in the 
lack of understanding between the Western Allies and 
burgeoning Russia. 
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Truman was an idealist and he could not comprehend 
the attitude of Stalin in regard to Eastern Europe. Repeat-
edly he stated his idealism in words like those delivered 
to the Congress at the death of Roosevelt: "In this shrink-
ing world, it is futile to seek safety behind geographical 
barriers. Real security will be found only in law and in 
justice." 66 
Later, when the United Nations was forged in San 
Francisco, Truman delivered the following statement of 
ideals: "With this charter the world can begin to look 
forward to the time when all worthy human beings may be 
permitted to live decently as free people.n67 
Again, in October, 1945, speaking at Navy Day cele-
brations in New York City, Truman said: 
65Ibid., p. 292 . 
6~arry s . Truman, Public Parers of the Presidents, 
(Washington: Government Printing Of ice, 19blT, p. ). 
67 Ibid. , p. 142. 
We believe that all peoples who are prepared 
for self- government should be permitted to choose 
their own form of government by their own freely 
expressed choice, without interference from any 
foreign source . That is true in ~urope, in Asia 
in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.68 
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These statements placed him diametrically opposite 
Stalin, who was working diligently to bring the Eastern 
European nations under Russian hegemony . Truman could not 
understand why Stalin refused to accept the statements of 
the Western Allies that they were seeking to live in peace-
ful relationships . 
The President expected that Russia would be will-
ing to cooperate in the post- war arrangement of the world 
in such a way as to avoid the likelihood of another war 
on the scale of World War II . The conference at Yalta, at 
which Roosevelt was quite ill and unable to match wits with 
Stalin, gave credence to the expectations of Truman . He had 
reason to believe that Russia was interested in preserving 
a balance of power in the world based on the conclusions of 
Yalta . 
It had been agreed at Yalta that the United 
States, Britain , Russia, China, and France would 
draw up a new trusteeship system to replace the 
mandate system of the League of Nations . These 
five nations were to make up the permanent 
bSibid . , p . 434 . 
membership of the Security Council . This trus-
teeship machinery would be made a part of the 
charter . 69 
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Truman's awakening came when Russia would not allow 
a genuinely represent ative coalition government to be formed 
in Poland . It was in response to the problem of Poland that 
the Potsdam Conference was called . At that meeting it became 
evident that Russia had her own plans for other parts of the 
world . Of course , it was not a secret that Russia had 
designs on Eastern Europe . That was written in the history 
of the relations of Russia with her European neighbors . 
Potsdam revealed that Russia held some hopes of gaining a 
part of the North African territory formerly held by Italy . 7° 
That Russia had an interest in the 1'-tiddle East was 
no surprise , but that she held hopes of establishing her-
self as a I·lediterranean power , especially in Africa , was 
significant . Churchill seemed to be aware of this desire, 
but Truman was not . 71 
An outline of the direction in which Russia was mov-
ing would begin with Poland , through the Eastern ~uropean 
countries of Czechoslovakia , Hungary, Romania , Bulgaria, 
69Truman, J:ID, Year of Decisions, p. 304 . 
7°rbid ., pp . 412- 13 . 
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the Balkan ~tates, Greece, and Libya. The latter was a 
matter for the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, 
but the others were vulnerable and Stalin set out to estab-
lish friendly governments in all of those areas. In all of 
these, except Africa and Greece, Russia was successful in 
having her way, managing to carry them along in the way 
she would have them go.72 
Greece was a prime target for the Communists, and the 
period just after the war was a time of civil disturbance, 
designed to establish there a government friendly to Russia. 
Truman successfully countered this move with the Truman 
Doctrine in 1947, enabling forces who were friendly to the 
West to re-establish their power.73 
The Truman Doctrine, not surprisingly, also included 
other areas, particularly those of the Middle East which 
bordered on Russian territory.74 The whole tier of nations 
from Greece to Iran was included in the statement of policy 
made to the Congress on ~~rch 12, 1947: 
72Harry s . 'l'ruman, 1946-g, Years of Trial and Hope 
(Vol. II of Memoirs . 2 vols.; New York: ~ignet Books, 1956), 
p. 277. 
73Ibid., pp. 127-29. 
74Ibid. 
I believe • • • that it must be the policy of 
the United States to support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures. I believe 
that we must assist free peoples to work out 
their own destinies in their own way . 75 
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In response to the Russian pressure on her neighbors 
in Europe and the .:rv1iddle Bast, and the suspected designs 
she had on other areas of the world, the 'l'ruman administra-
tion devised a policy of "containment.n76 The Western 
Powers would restrict the Russian expansion, not allowing 
her to conquer any more territory. 
Regarding Africa, it was the policy of the United 
States to remain aloof from the problems of that portion 
of the world out of deference to her allies. In the meeting 
between Clement Atlee, McKensie-King and Truman on Novem-
ber 10-15, 1945, not a word is mentionea regarding the impli-
cations of their statements for African dependencies . 77 
Also, in 1ruman ' s memoirs there is no mention of the 
implications of his foreign policy speech on Navy Day, 1945, 
75Ibid . 
76George F . Kennan, "'l'he ~ources of ;:,oviet Cona.uct," 
Foreign Affairs, 25:5bb-82, July, 1947. 
77Truman, ~, Year of Decisions, pp. 591-98 . 
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in which he advocated giving self- government to people who 
were ready . 78 
American expressions of sympathy for national feeling 
were regular occurrences, and Truman makes the following 
statement in his ?Jiemoirs : 
I had always been opposed to colonialism . 
vfuatever justification may be cited at any 
stage , colonialism in any form, is hateful 
to Americans . America fought her own \'lar of 
liberation against colonialism, and we shall 
always regard with sympathy and understanding 
the desire of peo2le everywhere to be free of 
colonial bondage . /9 
Truman unquestionably understood the role of the 
United States in the post-war world, remarking that: 
Out of this conflict have come powerful military 
nations, now fully trained ana equipped for war . 
But they have no right to aominate the world . It 
is rather the duty of these powerful nations to 
assume the responsibility for leadership toward a 
world of peace . That is why we have here resolved 
that power and strength shall be used not to wage 
war , but to keep the world at peace, ana free 
from the fear of war . BO 
The role of Russia was also appreciated in the United 
~tates . One analysis of the economic alignments of the 
world, by Alvin \·1. Hansen, sums up this role : 
7Bibid . ?9Ibid • , p . 3 Ob . 
80Ibid . , p . 324 . 
vfuat, now, are the prospects after World War II? 
A great new fact emerges from vlorld \-ar II . It 
will change the face of ~urope . It will pro-
foundly dominate the course of world history in 
the generations that lie before us . 
This great new fact is the rise of Russia on 
one side of the globe and the economic and 
military power of the United States on the 
other . A happy geographical accident--two great 
powers occupying vast continents and controlling 
vast resources in areas that are noncompetitive- -
this fact must be set down as a dominating and 
directing force in the fut~re course of history . Sl 
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This quite hopeful assessment of the rivalry between 
Russia and the United States was based on the geographical 
separation of the interests of the two powers.S2 
Hansen's geographical theory is interesting, as is 
his assessment of the post- war power of Britain . ~uch an 
estimate would explain the United States' reluctance to 
bring pressure to bear on matters relating to the colonies . 
In between those two powers on opposite sides 
of the globe is the British Bmpire which emerges 
from \lorld War II absolutely stronger than ever 
before . SJ 
Had Britain been able to assume her former role in 
the world, the alignment would have been of a different na-
ture . However, Britain was not able to take her former place 
SlAlvin H. Hansen, America 1 s Role in the \'torld 
Economy (New York : W. W. ~orton and Gompany, 1945), p . 16 . 
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in the world economy or government, as Truman realized near 
the end of his tenure . In early 1952, Churcnill came to the 
United States for urgent consultations with Truman . B4 
At that time , 'l'he New York Times stateci that the 
British problem was basically economic . She imported more 
than she expor ted and her reserves were dropping, placing 
her in a precarious economic position . B5 
The relative weakness of Britain was becoming appar-
ent, and the implications for the United States were empha-
sized by the fact that Truman and Churchill gave a large 
portion of their conversations to the problem of strategic 
metal imports , from Africa , as well as their division among 
the ~lest ern Allies . Bb 
Topics on the agenda included the Atlantic community , 
~oviet policy , the Far ~ast , Southeast Asia, the ~tiddle Bast , 
raw materials problems, Germany , NATO ana atomic energy .87 
B4The New York 1imes , January b, 1952 , page 4 , col . 1 . 
85rbia . 
B6James Reston , "Truman and Churchill Thresh Out 
~1ilitary and Production Problems , " The New York Times, 
1:7, January 8, 1952 . 
B7James Reston , "Churchill Begins TalKs with Truman," 
The New York Times, January b , 1952, p . 65 . 
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Submerged in this maze of problems was the fact that practi-
cally all of the fissionable materials for atomic energy 
came from the Belgian Congo, and a great portion of the 
copper came from the central African area, which included 
the Congo, and the Rhodesias . 
Africa , as a part of the world's power structure, 
had not yet emerged . But, the statements of ideology, 
which were unavoidably encouraging to the African national -
ists, were continuing . 'l'he seeming commitment of the United 
States to the principle of self-determination was feeding 
the flame of rebellion among the black people of the world . 
And, there were reassessments of the importance of the Brit-
ish Empire, making more realistic appraisals of its strength 
and resilience , because, since 1945, Britain had lost some 
four hundred million people from its contro1 . 88 
Beca~se of the impending demise of the British Empire , 
and the tendency of Americans to look upon themselves as the 
saviours of mankind, the statements of officials began to 
sound charismatic . Truman, in his State of the Union message 
of 1952, said: 
"The things we believe in most deeply are under 
relentless attack . We have the great responsibility 
88The New York Times, January 6, 1952, page 4. 
------
of saving the basic mqral and spiritual values 
of our civilization.n89 
John Foster Dulles , a Special Advisor to the State 
Department, remarked: 
"It is worth remembering that our nation had 
its greatest influence for good and also its 
greatest security during the last century, 
when we had little military strength and were 
not wealthy enough to give much away, ••• 
our greatness lay in producing exportable 
ideas.n90 
II. THE UNITED STATES "DISCOVERS" AFRICA 
38 
Africa remained on the fringe of American diplomatic 
concern. Through all the years following \forld War II, 
the Western Allies were preoccupied with matters in Europe , 
the Iv1iddle East , and Asia. 
The links between the United States and Africa 
extend far back into history; yet Africa was the 
last of the inhabited continents to assume a regu-
lar place in the grand design of American foreign 
policy.91 
B9Harry S . Truman , quoted in The New York Times, 
January 10, 1952, page 16. 
90John Foster Dulles, quoted in The New York Times , 
January 2, 1952, page 2. 
91Richard P . btebbins (ed.), The United States in 
World Affairs, 1961 (New York : Harper-ind Brothers , 19b2), 
p . 234. 
39 
Events were not to leave the United 0tates free to 
ignore the continent after 1952, for the spotlight of 
American concern centered upon Africa during that year . 
Some Americans were already aware of the problems of 
Africa. 'l'he Manchester Congress had not passed unnoticed 
by everyone, ana not everyone was indifferent to the fate 
of Africans . An article in Christian Century in June, 1945 , 
had advocated that the Western Po~;ers recognize in the 
peace treaties that Africa was not the " • • • rightful 
possession or permanent asset of .Buropean nations . " 
Further, the article urged that " ••• principles enun-
ciated in the Atlantic Charter should be made applicable 
to Africa, • • • n92 • 
Yet, the United States continued to view Africa as 
a province of Europe . It was not possible that America 
would view Africa with indifference, but, she did regard 
the continent as out of bounds for political interests . 
One journalist has observed: 
" • • • our lack of knowledge and contact on 
the one hand and our close ana vital relationship 
with Burope, the master of Africa, on the other, 
92H. . B. l'o1cC1enahan, "Africa lJeserves a Break," 
Christian Century, 62:707-08, June 13, 1945 . 
led us to view Africa primarily through ~uropean 
eyes. This is leading us to act in Africa on 
the basis of European interests.93 
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Africa received scant attention from American inter-
ests, either goverrunental or private. "Our foreign aid 
programs made only token contributions to African develop-
ment. Of our ~30 billion of overseas investment, less than 
three per cent was in Africa . n94 
East Africa burst on the scene in 1952 . One is im-
pressea as he scans the issues of The New York Times, to 
find that before 1952 very little was written about develop-
ments in ~ast africa; yet, from the early part of 1952, that 
area of the world was quite prominent in the news. Begin-
ning then, however, countless news items and articles were 
printed exposing the happenings in Africa.95 
~iorthy of note also was the suggestion in Iv1ay, 1952, 
that a mid-African conference, led by the United ~tates, be 
held to develop policies which would fall somewhere between 
93~ory H.oss, nv~orla • s Bell Tolls," 5aturday H.eview, 
36:22, kay 2, 1953 . 
94Arthur lvi . ~chlesinger, Jr., A 'l'housand Days, 
(tioston: Houghton l1.ifflin Company, l9b5), p. 551. 
95Richard P . ~tebbins (ed.}, The United States in 
World Affairs, ~(New York: Harper-arid Brothers, 1951), 
pp . 256-57. 
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"Malanism" ana North African 11liberalism . u96 Others called 
for the United States to heed the call of Portugal for such 
a conference, and to develop a consistent policy on Africa 
south of the Sahara . 97 
American preoccupation was with Britain and her 
ability to hold on to her colonial holdings . One example 
of her cooperation with the status guo in East Africa was 
the incident involving a man named ~iUgo Gatheru, who was a 
student at Lincoln University . In September, 1952, an 
agent of the United States Justice Department went to 
Lincoln University ana questioned Gatheru for four hours. 
The student received a letter on November 5, 1952, telling 
him that he must leave the country within thirty days or 
face aeportation . 98 
Gatheru was a student, and simply a student, but the 
fear displayed by the british, that those who went abroad 
for education woula return to assert their political rights, 
seemed to have eroded their sense of propriety . 
That the Unitea ~tates Government allowed itself to be 
drawn into the affair in this manner brings into question 
96The New York Times , I•1ay 12, 1952, page 3, col . 1 . 
97The New York Times, l\'iay 18, 1952, page 1, col . 3 • 
98st . Clair urake, "'l'he 'lerror That 't.alks by Day ," 
Nation, 175:490- 92 , November 29 , 1952 . 
its entire intelligence arrangement as well as its val-
uation of human freedom . The Kenya Africans, and their 
friends, certainly viewed the matter in this light . 
The Kenya autnorities know that l·~ugo is neither 
lv1au !•.i.auist or Gor11.rnunist . Are they simply aeter-
minea that he shall not graduate from Lincoln? 
Or could it be that American iu~igration officials 
cannot distinguish Gold Coastism from Con~unism 
and have ordered I~~ugo deported as H subversive n? 
~ugo-son-of-Gatheru is waiting to see whether the 
Statue of Lioerty means what he thought it meant . 99 
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Gatheru had incurrea the suspicion of the British 
colonial administration of Kenya because he had once written 
a letter asking when Africans would be able to vote . He had 
corresponded with people in America, and in 1948, a group 
called the Afro-World Fellowship , obtained a scholarship 
for him . He was not allowed a visa because he was looked 
upon as a trouble-maker due to the letter mentioned above .100 
Gatheru ' s subsequent trials in making his way to the 
United ~tates and taking advantage of the opportunity to 
study , make interesting reading , both in regard to the 
efforts of the british to th\'lart his quest to obtain an 
education, and the American official willingness to cooper-
ate with the British in their actions . 
As will be shown later , the United States was com-
mitted to the support of rlritain because of the strategic 
100Ibid . 
importance of East Africa militarily, and it did not take 
seriously the nationalist efforts in Africa south of the 
Sahara . 
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East Africa was news . And, the American public, as 
well as the government , took note of the area . There, in 
the far-off jungles, raged the naked passions of primitive 
men, with savages stalking the country- side wielding spears 
and knives . Wild animals roamed the plains , elephants 
trumpeted, lions roared, leopards screamed , and the hyena 
projected his insane laughter through the still nights of 
the plains. Books , movies , magazines , as well as other 
communications media emphasized the romance and excite-
ment of a far-away country complete with the atmosphere 
of a nineteenth century adventure into the dangerous 
frontier.lOl 
III • 'l'HE EISENHO\•f,ci;R ERA 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower came to the Presidency 
of the United States from command of the unified defense 
organization in Europe in 1953. Eisenhower, who had had 
no domestic political experience, and who had only a 
military orientation in international politics, acceded 
10ln5eason for .;afari," Newsweek , 45:78, 
February 28 , 1955. 
to the Presidency of the United States with t he attitude 
t hat the NATO arrangement was necessar y for the survival 
of \~/estern civilization .102 
The Nor th Atlantic Treaty Organization was foremost 
in the consider ation of Eisenhower during the latter part 
of his military career , and the Atlantic community con-
44 
tinued to be his first concern during his tenure . Par ticu-
larly , when the interests of Europe and Africa came into 
conflict, as they did in Kenya in 1952- 56, he consistently 
chose to support the col onial powers . 1he problem was 
stated in the following manner : 
"A central question is how U. s . operations 
in Africa relate to , ana what is their effect 
on , the colonial interests and administrations 
of our NATO allies . 11103 
His policies were always predicated on the premise 
of legality , and he was hesitant to offend either the 
colonials or those who were coming to power in the newer 
states of Africa . l04 However , expediency , with respect to 
102Dwight D. Eisenhower , 1~1andate for Change : 1.221-2.§ 
(Vol . I of The Vfuite House Years . 2 vols . ; Garden City, 
New York : Doubleday and Company , 1963) , p . 12 . 
103uavid L. Gordon, quoted in Africa Today, C. Grove 
Haines, editor (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press , 1955), 
p . 449 . 
104Richard P . Stebbins (ed . ) , The United States in 
Worla Affairs , ~ (New York: Harper ana Brothers, 1953T, 
p . 353 . 
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the declining capabilities of the British Empire, regularly 
won the day in American foreign policy . The colonies 
represented a formidable asset for Britain, and Bisenhower, 
with his close ties with ~urope, knew how desperate Britain 
had become in trying to maintain a prominent place in the 
government of the world. 
The importance of the colonies was spelled out by 
Elspeth Huxley in an article written for the magazine, 
Foreign Affairs: 
It is to Africa that Britain must look for 
that field for investment, source of raw mate-
rials and expanding market which she needs in 
order to survive , and she must win it quickly 
from the swamps ana forest and high veld of 
the last continent to be pioneered . l05 
The article continued to spell out the strategic 
importance of Africa for Britain, and forcefully deni-
grated the abilities of Africans to govern themselves . 
Eisenhower, as did Truman before him, consistently 
couched his policy statements in terms designed to take 
advantage of the American history of revolution, and to 
encourage those behind the "iron curtain" to rebel against 
their rulers . A typical statement of policy are these 
words, spoken at Columbia University in 1950: 
l05Elspeth Huxley, "British Aims in Africa," Foreign 
Affairs, 2S:43, October, 1949. 
"The best foreign policy is to live our daily 
lives in honesty, decency, and integrity; at 
home, making our own land a more fitting habita-
tion for free men; and, abroad, joining with 
those of like mind and heart, to make of the 
world a place where all men can dwell in 
peace . 11106 
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However, as President, Eisenhower developed a remark-
able affinity for John Foster Dulles, his ~ecretary of ~tate, 
and gave him extensive power to make policy and to determine 
action. It is instructive to note that President ~isenhower 1 s 
inaugural address made no mention of Africa.l07 Also, Dulles' 
first speech as Secretary of State referred to Africa only 
to suggest that trouble there would be because of 
Communism.l08 
Governmental thought had apparently been influenced 
by the opinions of such men as Sir Philip Mitchell, former 
Governor of Kenya, who said: 
When the British penetrated ~ast Africa its 
natives "had no wheeled transport ••• no roads 
nor towns • • • no tools • • • They had no means 
of writing, even by hieroglyphics, nor of number-
ing except by their fingers or making notches on 
a stick • • • Perhaps most astonishing of all to 
106Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in The New York Times, 
January 13, 1952, page 5, col . 6 . 
107Dwight D. Eisenhower, Text of Inaugural Address 
quoted in The New York Times, January 21, 1953, page 19. 
lOSJohn Foster Dulles, quoted in The New York Times, 
January 28, 1953, page S . 
the European mind~ they had no calendar nor 
notion of time . 111 U9 
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Africa had erupted in 1952. Kenya had suffered the 
l·J.C.U l·J.C.U rebellion , which captured the attention of many 
Americans . North Africa began to experience the agony of 
colonial rebellion as the Arab people expressed their long 
suppressed desire to rule themselves once more .110 
Alan Paton, the eminent authority on Africa, wrote: 
The white man in Black Africa moves to give 
the African what he demands . He is there to 
teach, which he does nobly some of the time. 
But in the ~outh, he is called on to share 
with the African, which is much more difficult 
to do .lll 
The importance of the movement toward independence 
had been emphasized by the American representative on the 
United Nations Trusteeship Council when he wrote in 1950: 
The policies which we adopt toward the back-
ward areas of Asia and africa will have conse-
quences quite as far- reaching and profound as 
will the more spectacular decisions which we 
make in the stupendous struggle now raging 
109~ir Philip I,.itchell , former Governor of Kenya , 
quoted in "Colonialism ' s Challenge ," Newsweek , 46:40, 
October 31 , 1955 . 
llQrhe New York Times , January 26, 1952, page 1 . 
lllAlan Paton, "Africa, \wakening , Challenges the 
•'forld," 'l'he New York Times !~tagazine , July 6, 1952, page 6. 
between ~oviet Russia and the free world. On 
their outcome hangs the future of civiliza-
tion.ll2 
Men from the emerging nations also pointed up the 
importance of the events in the areas that had been ruled 
48 
by colonialism. Jl·.~.oshe bharett suggested before the United 
Nations that there were two struggles going on in the 
world ; one of them was the contest between Last and lest , 
or the "cold war." "The other--which was to prove equal 
if not greater concern to this Assembly--had as its 
scene a vast belt of territories in Asia and Africa . ull3 
An indication of the airection of United States 
policy with regard to Africa generally , and East Africa 
specifically , was a controversy which came before the 
United Nations in 1952 concerning the summary removal of 
a group of Africans , from tribal lands on the slopes of 
Mt . Kilimanjaro, to less productive areas. In the voting 
on resolutions dealing with the \~ameru removal, the United 
States voted with Britain to validate action of the colonial 
government of Tanganyika , justifying their actions on the 
ll2F . B. Sayre , "lq!uest for Independence ," Foreign 
Affairs , 30 :564 , July , 1950 . 
ll3I•10she Sharett, quoted in 1'he United States in 
World Affairs, 1221, Richard P . Stebbins, editor (New 
York: Harper and Brothers , 1952), p . 371 . 
grounds that it enabled the country to more efficiently 
use its land in the production of exportable commodities, 
especially coffee .ll4 
The United btates was caught in a dilemma . On the 
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one hand she had sympathy for those who were trying to over-
throw colonialism, but on the other she had to pacify her 
partners in the \~estern defense arrangement . De Kiewiet 
asserts that, 11 ••• the African policy of the United 
States is split down the middle by a stubborn and trouble-
some contradiction between immediate strategic and 
ultimate historic interests . nll5 
Paul H. Nitze , former Director of the Policy Planning 
btaff of the Department of ~tate noted the necessity of a 
change of attitude in the men who determined policy with 
regard to those areas which were coming to independence : 
My former colleague , c . B. karshall, has empha-
sized the point that the test of a nation ' s great-
ness is whether it can adjust from a position where 
it once disposed to a position where it must deal 
with problems . The Spaniards \vere not able to 
make that transition successfully and suffered the 
consequences . At one time the West disposed with 
ll4chadwick Hall, "Colonialism in the United Nations, 11 
Nation, 175 :359, October 18, 1952 . 
115c . \'L De Kiewiet, "African Dilemmas , " Foreign 
Affairs , 33 :447, April , 1955 . 
respect to Africa . Today it is necessary to deal 
with Africa . The basic challenge is whether the 
West can do this constructively and imaginatively .llo 
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John Gunther summed up American attitudes toward ~ast 
Africa in 1953 with these words : 
United ~tates interest in East Africa is not 
pronounced . Washington has always thought of 
it-- indeed the whole world of the Indian Ocean--
as predominantly a british sphere .ll7 
\ihat was true of Kenya was also true of the rest of 
Africa. They were looked upon as provinces of the colonial 
powers and the United ~tates had no direct interest in 
their internal circumstances . 
IV . TH~ TIDE TURNS 
The action of world politics had been moving grad-
ually from the North to the ~outh . Truman had his first 
taste of conflict with Russia in Poland. As the cold war 
wore on events moved slowly southward through the East 
European states and into the J~ddle East, bringing neces-
sary adaptations of policy and attitudes. 
llbPaul H. Nitze quoted in Africa Today, C. Grove 
Haines, editor (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 
p. b5 . 
ll7John Gunther, Inside Africa {New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1953), p . 350 . 
President Eisenhower emphasized this change of 
arena in his memoirs: 
Beginning in the latter months of my first 
term and for several years tnereafter, no region 
of the worla received as much of my close atten-
tion and that of my colleagues as did the 
Middle East . ll8 
The 1'<1idale Bast crisis of 1956, closely connected 
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with the Hungarian uprising, marked a turning point in the 
entire relationship of the United States with the emerging 
nations of the world . 
In Egypt, Gamal Abael Nasser had taken over the Suez 
Canal in response to a move by ~ecretary of ~tate Dulles 
cancelling proffered American aid for the Aswan Dam . 
Claiming that such a move was necessary in order to pay 
for the aam, from the revenues of the canal, Nasser was 
able to gain support from Russia and whip the ~iestern 
nations into line .ll9 It was a diplomatic coup for Nasser 
and for Russia . 
ll8.L)wight D. Eisenhower, \~aging Peace : 1.2.2.£- bl (Vol . 
II of The white House Years . 2 vols . ; Garden City, New 
York: Doubleaay and Company, 19b5), p. 20 . 
ll9samuel .tUiot l•lOrison, The Oxford History of the 
American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965T, 
p. 1095 . 
The President himself indicated the reason for 
United States temporizing in the Suez crisis: 
vle could not permit the ~oviet Union to seize 
the leadership in the struggle against the use of 
force in the hiddle East and thus win the confi-
dence of the new indepenaent nations of the world. 
But on the other hand l by no means wanted the 
British and French to be branded as naked aggres-
sors without provocation . I therefore instructed 
Foster to draft two statements : an announcement 
of our suspension of all military and some govern-
mental economic aid to Israel; and a moderate reso-
lution for submission to the General Assembly in 
an effort to block a resolution--certain to be an 
objectionable one--by the boviet Union . l20 
Dulles apparently: did not believe, prior to Suez, 
that Egypt could manage the seizure of the canal from 
Britain and France, or operate it . But, with Russia on 
the verge of gaining the complete confidence of t he Arab 
nations, and thereby threatening to extend her absolute 
influence beyond Europe into the strategically important 
areas of the Miadle East, the United ~tates had to act to 
retain the trust of the newly independent nations, saving 
52 
some semblance of 11Iestern influence in all these important 
areas . 
Nasser's success brought a new assessment of the 
emerging nations by the United States , especially in Africa . 
In a conversation with Nehru of India, the timeliness of a 
1 20Eisenhower, Waging Peace: ~-bl, p . 83 . 
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policy change was underscored . The United ~tates must now 
act in a direct relationship with the emerging nations in 
order to salvage Western influence in those countries. 
Nehru talked to the President about nationalism as related 
to the two power groups of the world: 
This woula be a propitious moment, he suggested, 
because of the blunder of the Soviets in Hungary, 
for the Free ~·/orld to move to strengthen the 
faith and hope of those who would like to live in 
independence but who have been misled, at least 
partly, by Communist doctrine . l21 
The realization that Africa was progressing inexorably 
toward independence and that the colonial powers were losing 
their positions there haa finally dawned upon the American 
administration . This, coupled with a puritanical obsession 
with the American role of leadership, led the President and 
his advisors to revise their estimates of, and policies 
toward, the African nationalists . President Eisenhower 
commented: 
The United ~tates was not directly involved, 
for we had no territorial claims in Africa. But , 
with a position of leadership in the Free ~orld, 
we did not want to see chaos run wild among hope-
ful, expectant peoples and could not afford to 
see turmoil in an area where the Communists would 
be only too delighted to take an advantage. In 
spite of the relatively high regard in which the 
United ~tates was held in most of the newly 
emerging nations because of our anti-colonial 
tradition , our close alliances with some of the 
former colonial powers caused vexing complica-
tions in Africa . l22 
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The Unitea ~tates began to search for a policy which 
would allow it to be connected with both the old colonial 
powers and the new nations as they took their places in 
the coWlcils of the world . Vernon lvLcKay wrote in 1957 
about the developing political awareness in Tanganyika, 
when Julius Nyerere , a teacher from the Lakes Region of 
that Trust Territory , began to organize the nation for 
independence .123 l•1cKay' s comment on the efforts of the 
United States to evolve a policy is pertinent and incisive : 
The policy which has come out of these deliber-
ations is veiled in ambiguity and expressed in 
generalities that have lost their glitter, but 
its essence is that the United States supports 
the goal of self- government or independence for 
all peoples who have the desire and the capacity 
to maintain it . In government circles t his is 
called a balanced or middle- of- the- road policy 
of constructive moderation . The public calls it 
f ence - sitting . There is an element of truth in 
both descriptions . l24 
Eisenhower sent Vice-President Nixon on a trip to 
Africa in 1957, se eking some light on the conditions there 
l22rbid ., p . 572 . 
l23vernon lv1cKay , nToo Slow or Too Fast, n Foreign 
Affairs , 35 :303, July , 1957 . 
l 24rbid . , p . 307 . 
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and looking for ways to maintain the ambivalent policy which 
had been pursued for so long . His report to the President 
was presented on april 7, 1957 .125 
However, Nixon's trip did not bring him into meaning-
ful contact with the forces of nationalism in southern Africa. 
'l'he United Press made the follo\'ling comment on his itinerary: 
Apart from a brief stop in Uganda, ~~. Nixon 
had no opportunity to examine the tensions 
associatea with political ana economic growth 
in those African countries that stood lower 
down on the timetable of inaependence . l26 
Perhaps the most meaningful action taken by the United 
~tates in the post-war years, in relation to Africa , was the 
creation of the Bureau of African Affairs . This action was 
taken in the latter part of 1957 and marked a significant 
step forward in the relationships of the United btates with 
the area of Africa south of the Sahara . l 27 
Surprising and enlightening is the comment of Arthur 
M. ~chlesinger, Jr . as he reviewed the establishment of 
the Africa Bureau, that in 1957 there were still more 
125Paul E . Zinner (ed . ), Documents££ American Foreign 
Relations, 1957 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1958), 
pp . 5 et seqq . 
126Richard P . Stebbins (ed . ) , The United ~tates in 
World Affairs, 1221 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958T, 
p . 201 . 
127~chlesinger, loc . cit . 
Foreign bervice functionaries in \Jest Germany than in all 
of the countries of Africa . l28 
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But , the establishment of the Bureau did not alter 
the attituaes of those who determined United States policy . 
In commenting on the course of Africa toward independence, 
Joseph Palmer, II, Assistant becretary for African Affairs , 
remarked: 
"It is , of course , a matter of the greatest 
importance that the word 'orderly' be emphasized 
in this connection . It is axiomatic that member-
ship in the family of nations carries with it 
responsibilities to the group . It is a matter 
of vital importance that this be known and 
accepted by the emerging peoples . In the long 
run , premature independence may contain as many 
dangers for Africa and Africans as the denial 
of that status . "129 
But, the establishment of the Bureau was a needed step 
to remedy the problem faced by the United States in communi-
eating with the Africans . State officials now recognized 
that Africa should receive the same attention as other 
geographical areas of the world .13° 
American commitment to qualified independence con-
tinued through the latter years of the 1950's . 
128Ibid . 
129Joseph Palmer, II, quoted by Henry L. bretton in 
African Indepentience, Peter Judd, editor (New York : Dell 
Publishing Company , 1962) , p . 447 . 
130Paul E . Zinner (ed . ) , Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, l2i2 (New York: Harper and Hrothers, 
l9b0) , p . 40b . 
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3ecretary of State Herter reiterated the conviction that 
careful preparation for independence should precede the 
granting of self- government to the colonies . l31 Yet , Herter 
also went forwara to a new position when he remarked: 
"Political advancement in the non- self- governing 
and trust territories of Africa is a tribute to the 
imagination , good will, and skill of the peoples of 
those territories and of the powers that administer 
them . It is also a tribute to the encouragement 
and assistance given by the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies to the advancement of these 
territories . 11132 
Africa had not occupied the attention of American 
diplomatic concern pr ior to the crisis of 1956, because 
it was considered to be both beyond the bounds of proper 
involvement by the United States, and because it was 
thought to be out of the arena of the cold war . l33 
However , the events of 1956 and 1957, the Lebanon 
crisis bringing the assertion of the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
injected nev1 elements into the international consciousness . 
Until that time, the !VJ.iddle Bast was considered relatively 
free from the influence of the Soviet Union . But, the 
13lchristian Herter, quoted in Documents 0n American 
Foreign Relations, !222, Paul g . Zinner , editor TNew York: 
Harper and Brothers, 19b0), p . 37 . 
132Ibid. 
133henry L. Bretton, "United ~tates Foreign Policy 
Toward the Newly Inaependent ::>tates,n African Independence, 
Peter Judd, editor (New York : Dell ~ublishing Gompany, 
1962), p . 448 . 
series of happenings in those years indicated both the 
continued interest of Russia in the I~ida.le East and the 
willingness of the newly independent states to cooperate 
with them. 
Indeed, for many years the foreign policy of the 
United States had been dictated by simple reaction to 
Russian action . l34 
Constant reference to ~oviet initiative is made by 
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the top echlon of American policy makers . In January, 1959, 
Unaer-~ecretary of State Douglas Dillon made the following 
comment on policy considerations of the United States: 
nrro meet the Soviet challenge and to give 
reality to our own effort to help the people 
of the newly developing nations in their 
attempts to fight their way out of the bitter 
slavery of poverty, ignorance , and aisease, 
we must marshall all the peaceful tools of 
trade and aid available to us .nl35 
American relations with African states are pointed up 
by dealings with ~ekou Toure of Guinea, when in 1958 he 
defied De Gaulle's attempt to cement the French international 
134Richard P . ~tebbins (ea . ), !he United States in 
World Affairs , ~ (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19521', 
p . 406 . 
135nouglas Dillon, quoted in Documents 2£ American 
Foreign Helations , ~' Paul E. Zinner , editor (New York : 
Harper ana Brothers , 1960), p . 142 . 
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community with binding ties . "Toure turned to the East, 
secured anns from Czechoslovakia . Then the United ~tates 
acted, but only tentatively and niggardly . nl36 This 
reactionary policy by the United States said to the African 
states that, " • • • we were not interested in Africa, 
except as a cold war bastion • . . ul37 • 
The ambivalent attitude of the United ~tates was 
dictated by the complex mixture of ~ estern alliances, 
domestic idealism, economic interests , and the felt neces-
sity to counter the actions of the Communists . l38 
V. THE CHAI'vG.r..D DEFJ!.NSE PO~'l'UltE 
One final element of the policy decisions of the 
Eisenhower Administration is to be noted in the virtual 
destruction of Western defense arrangements in the Middle 
Bast, or, at least, the aanger of such disruption . 
Dulles had attempted to surround the ~oviet Union 
with a ring of defensive alliances . 'l'he NATO alliance was 
the first of these treaties . This was followed by the 
:::>outheast Asia 1'reaty Organization, designed to thwart any 
l36Hretton, ££• cit ., p . 451 . 
l37rbid . 
l38Ibid . , p. 446 . 
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Communist attempt to break out of the ring thrown around 
Communist states from Japan to Pakistan . But, the area of 
the ~addle East, particularly with the events of l95b, 
indicated a decided weakness in that area . As one military 
man commented : 
The loss of the ~.1iadle E.ast would, if it 
included Egypt, give the enemy access to the 
African continent by land . The way then would 
lie open to thrusts westward along the North 
African coast and southward into the Sudan 
and through Ethiopia . The prize along the 
latter route would be British East Africa and 
South Africa • • • \ve would then have the 
Soviet Union at our own doorstep, the control 
of the Atlantic challenged and South America 
threatened ••• This is the nightmare that, 
in the years to come, we must prevent, either 
in whole or in part , ever becoming reality . l39 
This analysis by Admiral Richard L. Conolly, indi-
cated the seriousness with which the United ~tates viewed 
the events in the Iviiddle East in l95b and 1957 . He indi-
cated that the United States considered British and French 
plans for defense of the continent to be inadequate and 
suggests the extent of those plans in the heart of Africa . 
He suggests that the departure of Britain from the 1'<1iddle 
l39Richard L. Conolly, "Africa ' s ~trategic ~ignifi­
cance," Africa 'l'oday , C. Grove Haines , editor {Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press , 1955), p . 62. 
East left that front line virtually defenseless and the 
second line inadequately prepared . 
In the case of the British, the defense in 
depth extended from Palestine, where they aid 
have a considerable number of troops (although 
in a politically precarious position), thence 
back through the Suez Canal, ~gypt , and the 
~udan. It was finally to be based on British 
East Africa, where a new Britain overseas was 
envisaged . This development apparently was to 
include new military--and naval- base facilities 
that woula provide for the possible loss of 
buez . l40 
~viaently, the \fest ern Allies viewed the impending 
exit of Britain and France from positions of dominance in 
the ~1iddle ,ri;ast with grave concern. 
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Efforts were made to effect an alliance of those new 
states of the lv.liadle Bast which would deny Russia access to 
that area and which would make for security of lines of 
communication with sources of supply in Africa, as well as 
staging areas for possible troop movements threatening the 
\'/estern Hemisphere . 
~ast Africa was central in the plans of the Allies 
to draw an effective line of defense farther south in East 
and Central Africa . l41 
Clearly, if the aefensive posture of the ~:e stern 
Allies was to be maintained, new relationships needed to be 
14°Ibid . , pp . 57-58 . 141Ibia . , p. bl . 
formed with the emerging nations . The Baghdad Pact even-
tually was formed to be the basis of retention of the 
Middle East as the first line of defense .142 
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Because of the urgency of the defensive consideration , 
the United ~tates began to renovate its official relations 
with the new states . Thus , the significance of the forma-
tion of the ~ureau of African Affairs within the Department 
of ~tate is clarified . 
The ola policy of Secretary Dulles had insisted on 
an absolute adherence to one side or the other in the cold 
war . Further, he injected into the American mind the con-
viction that those who were neutral were taking an immoral 
position . l43 
However , with the vain effort in 1957 to persuade the 
Africans to line up with the United 3tates in the cold war, 
a search was begun for more workable policies regarding the 
African states , precisely because of the strategic impor-
tance of certain parts of that continent to defense 
arrangements . l44 
142Eisenhower, Mandate for Change : !22l-2£, p . 574 . 
143 , hl . "t 506 ~c es~nger , ££• ~. , p . • 
144Hichard P . Stebbins (ed . ), Documents 2n American 
Foreign Relations, 1960 (New York: Harper ana ~rothers, 
1961), p . 165 . 
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VI. ElS~NHOW~R ANL DULL~~ 
General Eisenhower constantly iterated American 
idealism, speaking about sucn matters as freedom, self-
determination, economic progress, and all the things men 
speak of when talking in generalities. Indeed, one perti-
nent criticism of Americans is that they have consistently 
refused to recognize the reality of the circumstances of 
the world when they have uttered platitudes regarding free-
dom, plenty, liberty or other ideals . And, the policy of 
the United btates remained that of maintaining the status 
guo, which vitiated all the idealism expressed by the 
leaders of the country .145 Henry L . Bretton said: 
It is not suggested that there existed in 
United ~tates official circles no genuine devo-
tion to humanitarian principles or a real com-
mitment to freedom and human dignity . \~bat 
matters here is that, by its own preference 
and in the face of prevailing domestic and 
international political pressures, the United 
~tates government over the years has lagged 
behind not only the boviet advocates of anti-
colonialism, but even the colonial powers 
themselves . For in London, Paris ana Brussels 
the need for substantial reform and change was 
being recognized while United ~tates officials 
still insisted on stability and observance of 
"law ana order . "l46 
l45Bretton, ££· cit., p. 451. 
146Ibid . , p. 448. 
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VII • 'l'HE KENN~DY COURTSHIP 
Developments in the politics of nations after 1lorld 
War II made it inevitable that the United ~tates woula be 
increasingly occupied with matters relating to Africa in 
the second half of the twentieth century.l47 
Accordingly, an increased interest in the continent 
arose throughout the American populace. ~very phase of the 
American nation was attracted to the area that had been 
neglected for so long . This interest became increasingly 
apparent in the election campaign of 1960, and in the year 
immediately preceding it.l4S 
American change of attitude toward Africa was part 
of a larger revision which encompassed all the unaer-
developed nations of the worla. Arthur lVl . :::,chlesinger, Jr . 
has commented: "Of the various transformations wrought in 
the Kennedy years none was less noted or more notable than 
the revolution in American attitudes toward the uncowaitted 
world.nl49 
l47Richard P. Stebbins (ea.), The United btates in 
World Affairs, ~ (~ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1959T, 
p. 240. 
l48Paul E. Zinner (ea . ), Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, !222 (New York: Harper and brotners , 
l9bO), p. 414. 
l49~chlesinger, QQ . cit., p . 507. 
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John F . Kennedy had been a member of the ~enate 
Foreign Relations Committee and had been Chairman of the 
African Subcommittee . In that capacity he called attention 
to the vital changes that were taking place in the newly 
developing countries , and focused the concern of the United 
States on the problems of Africa to an extent now known 
before .1 5° 
vuring the campaign of 1960, Kennedy made 479 refer-
ences to Africa in his speeches . l51 Appropriate indeed was 
the development that the candidate who knew most about the 
continent came to the Presidency in that crucial year . 
However , Kennedy could not overcome the inertia of 
years of policy developed in previous administrations. 
And, as a matter of fact , the Kennedy Admi nistration 
endorsed the policy of the previous administration .152 
Although the new President and his close advisors 
wished to revise the policy of the Unitea States, they had 
to consider first those who had obtained, through long years 
of association, positions of power and influence i n the 
President ' s party .l53 Thus, in the 1960's there 
l5°Ibid ., p . 554 . 151rbid . 
1)2Bretton , ££• ~., p . 459 . 
153~chlesinger , ££· cit., p . 509 . 
emerged the necessity to slowly and carefully revise the 
attitudes of government in policy matters . 'l'his is a long 
and tedious task . As the Council on Foreign Relations 
not.ed : 
Even in l9bl, Africa retained a certain novelty 
as an area of American concern, and American policy 
there continued to be marked by a spirit of origi -
nality and, at times, of frank experimentation . l54 
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Few in the United ~tates shared the concern for Africa 
that Kennedy had s hown in his ~enate tenure, and the Senate 
Subcommittee lapsed into inaction when Senator Gore resigned 
from the chairmanship in 1963 .155 
As the new administration began its formidable task 
in 1960, at the height of the Congo crisis, Kennedy appointed 
G. l-'1ennen \IJilliams to the sensitive post of Assistant Sec-
retary for African Affairs, the first appointment he made 
in the Department of State . In making the appointment he 
remarked that it was a position of highest importance in 
the administration . l56 
154Richard P . ~teboins (ea . ), The United ~tates in 
World Affairs, 1961 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1962T, 
p . 234 . 
155~chlesinger, 2£• cit . , p . 557 . 
156rbid . , p . 555 . 
Also worthy of note is the assertion of O:,chlesinger 
that because of the sensitivity of Africans to racial 
difficulties within the country, Kennedy was persuaded to 
remove the name of Senator William Fulbright from the list 
of possible appointees as Secretary of ~tate .157 
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As is true throughout the post -war years, the iaealism 
of the United ~tates, at least in public statements meant 
for the ears of foreign diplomats, served to heighten the 
feeling among African nationalists that the United ~tates 
and African nations shar ed the same goals . 
By promoting an image of an identity of goals 
between the American and African revolutions, 
through repeated references to such terms as 
"freedom, 11 "democracy," "liberty," invocations 
of the words of the American founding fathers 
and so on, the American public was being sub-
jected to a massive misrepresentation . l)B 
Many public figures were affected by the aesire to 
win the Africans to our side in the cold war , and they missed 
few opportunities to make it clear that Africa and the United 
States shared the same anti- colonial desires . 
Kennedy felt that the new nations of Africa and Asia 
were the new field of operations in the conflict between 
democracy and Communism and that a new policy of recognition 
l57Ibid . , p . 140 
15BBretton, QE• cit ., p . 46b . 
and respect for the neutrals was most likely to win their 
cooperation in the international councils of nations .159 
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Consequently, when Liberia placed before the Security 
Council of the United Nations, in February, 1961, a resolu-
tion calling for Portugal to comply with the United Nations' 
policy against colonialism and proposing an inquiry into 
the Angola circumstances, Kennedy took the opportunity to 
indicate a change of American policy . lbO 
Although the resolution failed in the ~ecurity 
Council, the United States had projected a new image, and 
would not thereafter be automatically thought of as an 
advocate of co1onialism . l6l It was a tentative stand, 
but one designed to say that the Americans were taking a 
position somewhat removed from those ~uropean Allies who 
had been so determinative of her attitudes in the post- war 
world . 
An incident which points up the importance attached 
to the new policy towards Africa occurred in 1961 . G. ~ennen 
Williams was making one of his frequent trips to Africa, and 
made an unfortunate reference in favor of "Africa for the 
Africans . n Of course a howl of protest went up, since the 
l59~ch1esinger, QE· cit . , p . 507 . 
160rbid ., p . 512 . l61Bretton, QQ. cit . , p. 4bl . 
statement was made in Nairobi, Kenya, the stronghold of 
British settlers. President Kennedy thought it expedient 
to uphold the ~ecretary and gave his endorsement to a 
qualification made by ~Jilliams .162 
Such an incident served the purpose of shifting 
United States policy from that of automatic support of 
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European nations allied in the various defense arrangements 
to that of a uni-lateral policy which would take into con-
sideration all facets of the world situation in making 
policy . 
American policy toward Africa was stated by 
\lilliams in a Department of State Bulletin in Iv1arch, 1964, 
which was an extension of the policy received by the 
Johnson Administration at the unfortunate demise of 
President Kennedy: 
In recent years governmental assistance has 
been addea to private efforts to help meet Africa 's 
neeas. We are now assisting African nations 
through such organizations as the Peace Corps, 
the Agency for International Development , the 
~xport-Import Bank ; through exchange programs 
and scholarships: and through our contributions 
to international organizations.lb3 
162a. Mennen Williams , quoted in The United States in 
\'lorld Affairs , 1961, Richard P. Stebbins , editor (l'lew York : 
Harper and Brothers, 1962), p . 247 . 
163a. 1•1ennen Williams, "Promising Trends in Africa , 11 
Department of ~tate Bulletin , 50:3 73, l·1arch 9, 1964. 
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Although concern for Africa increased during 
Kennedy ' s years in office, the many tasks of governing did 
not allow him to focus his attention on the continent . 
However, ~chlesinger points out that : 
••• his curiosity v.ras unremitting . He cared 
very much, for example, about the performance 
of his African ambassadors and rarely failed to 
see them when they came home on consultation .l64 
The United ~tates was preoccupied with other problems 
of the world to a greater extent than with Africa . The 
annals of foreign policy repeatedly indicate that the United 
States could not afford to maintain a policy that would 
vitiate the positions of her European Allies . Practicality 
aictated that the United ~tates not destroy their power 
precipitately . lb5 
It could be said that in a world where the 
warning sirens are constantly shrieking in one 
corner or another , africa has still not become 
enough of a danger point to command full 
American attention .lbb 
To this point, at least, Africa has not demanded as 
urgent a consideration as other areas. Consequently , she 
remains on the fringe of United btates interest . 
lb4schlesinger, oo . cit . , p . 55b . 
l65Rupert Emerson , "'l'he Character of American Inter-
ests in Africa , " in The United States and Africa, ~lalter 
Golaschmidt, eaitor (New York : irederick A. Praeger, l9o3), 
p . 25 . 
lb6Ibid . 
CHAPI'ER IV 
THE UNI'l'ED STATES AND EAC>T AFRICAN IDEAS 
Semantics makes personal con~unication a difficult 
art . ~fuether they are differences involved in dialects 
within a country, or the more hopeless efforts of communi-
cating between languages, one must have respect for the 
problem of determining the meaning of words . 
After Uorld War II, the matter of conununications 
assumed an even greater gravity. Although Stalin may have 
talked about democracy, the word conveyed an entirely dif-
ferent concept to him tnan to Truman . belf- aetermination 
was also much talked about, but it meant different things 
to Truman and Jomo Kenyatta . 
Differences in concepts may account for many of the 
seeming deviations from idealisms which were expressed by 
Africans and Westerners alike . vfuen 'lruman spoke of self-
determination, or democracy, or freedom, or some other word 
in the Western vocabulary, those words did not necessarily 
mean the same things to nationalists in Africa, who were 
intent upon achieving for themselves the privilege of 
self- rule . 
I . THE I.-IEANING OF ID.t.:OLOGY 
For the purposes of this study, the following defi-
nition of ideology, given by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., will be 
used: 
Ideology is a set of value- related beliefs 
which are at least partly systematized . The 
three necessary components of an ideology are 
beliefs, values, and system (interdependence) . 
Values account for action orientation and 
commitment associated with ideology . l67 
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Within the framework of this definition, all peoples 
are capable of ideology . No matter how primitive their 
culture, it is based on a set of values, and is systema-
tized , therefore it is an ideology . 
While tnere are men who would deny that Africans are 
capable of such sophistication, they are few at the present 
time . However, in the years preceding the attainment of 
independence by African countries , such men were not only 
numerous, they were influential . Bstimates such as that of 
bir Philip lv1itchell , once Governor of Kenya, to whom refer-
ence was made on page forty- six, reflect the conviction that 
Africans are not capable of ideology . 
A similar statement may be found in the article 
written by Margery Perham, who often has been quoted as an 
lb7Joseph S . Nye, Jr . , Pan-Africanism and East 
African Integration (Cambridge, l•1assachusetts : Harvard 
University Press, 1965), p . 29 . 
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expert on African affairs. In aefending the British 
against the criticisms of Americans regarding their colonial 
policies, she uses the words "backwaraness , n nuncivilizea,u 
"semi- civilized," "unproductive , n nunorganized , " ana other 
similar words to aescribe the accomplishments of the 
Africans before the British came upon the scene . l68 
II . WES'l'ERN PltON0UNC.&•lE~'l'S 
From the inception of the Atlantic Charter, to the 
present , statements poured from the lips of Western leaders 
that whetted the appetites of African nationalists . 
Arthur k . ~chlesinger , Jr . says, "~ince the time of 
Franklin ltoosevelt American policy had had a nominal commit-
ment to anti - colonialism . nl69 
Truman, on numerous occasions, talked of the right of 
self- determination for all peoples . His pronouncement in 
asserting the 'l'ruman Doctrine, gave hope to all those in 
Africa as well as those of the Miadle East . In his memoirs, 
1681\'largery Perham, "African Facts ana American Criti-
cisms," Foreign Affairs , 22:444 , April, 1944 . 
169 Arthur t-'i . Schlesinger , Jr ., A Thousand Days 
{Boston: Houghton t-.ifflin Company, l9b5T, p . 5IO:'" 
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the President said, "I still believed in \'ioodrow \'lilson 1 s 
philosophy of 1 self - determination . 1 ul70 Also, after the 
meeting of Truman anu Attlee in December, 1950, their final 
communique committed both to certain principles : 
It reaffirmed that the objectives of our two 
nations were the same; namely, to maintain world 
peace and respect for the rights and interests of 
all peoples, to promote strength and confidence 
among the freedom- loving countries of the world, 
to eliminate the causes of fear, want, ana dis-
content, and to advance the democratic way of 
life . l71 
President Eisenhower also seemed to place the United 
States on the side of the Africans when he made his trip to 
Africa in 1959 . He later stated : 
I believe that our talks, formal and informal, 
helped to persuade national leaders and millions 
of people that the United States had no selfish 
purpose in cooperating with them; that we sought 
no territory; did not wish to dominate ; and 
believed in freely chosen governments for peoples 
and nations everywhere . l72 
Eisenhower seemed to be on safe ground at the time, 
for he did not envisage the possibility of any new 
l7~arry s . Truman, ~' Year of Decisions (New 
York: bignet Books, 1955), p . 306. 
1 71Harry S . Truman, 1916-.2£, Years of Trial and Hope 
(New York : bignet Books, 1956 , p. 467 . 
172.uwight D • .t:isenhower, \~aging Peace, J:2i£- 61 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), 
p . 512 . 
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African countries coming to independence, and he was 
supported by his Secretary of ~tate, John Foster uulles . l73 
The independence march gained ground in 1960, and 
forced Eisenhower to reassess the rapidity with which 
African nations were advancing toward their goal . On 
September 20, 1960, he addressed the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and proposed in part: 
• • • a pledge by all countries represented at 
this Assembly to respect the African peoples' 
right to choose their own way of life and to aeter-
mine for themselves the course they choose to 
follow • • • .174 
John F . Kennedy brought youth and vitality to the 
Presidency . He too pronounced the commitment of the United 
States to the principles of independence and self- aetermina-
tion . An example is his speech in Independence Hall, 
Philaaelphia, Pennsylvania on July 4, 19o2, in which he 
stated : 
"The theory of independence, as old as man 
himself, was not invented in this hall, but it 
was in this hall that the theory became a 
practice, that the word went out to all the 
world that 'the God who gave us life gave us 
liberty at the same time .' 11175 
173rbid., p . 370 . l74rbid., p . 579 . 
l75John F . Kennedy, quoted in The Burden and the 
~' Allan Nevins, editor (New York: Harper ana Row, 
l9o4), p . 110 . 
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Kennedy, perhaps more than any other leader in the 
post - \';ar years, gave the impression that the United ::>tates 
sympathized with the aspirations of the African nationalists 
in their search for identity ana self- government . Below are 
some of the apparent differences between African and 
American thought. 
III • 'I'H1 COLD \~AR 
Nothing was more on the minds of American officials 
than the contest between the United ~tates ana the Soviet 
Union . Beginning in the waning days of \Wrla War II and 
continuing to the present, it has claimed all elements of 
policy for its own, giving no area of state relationships 
freedom from its demands . ~chlesinger gives the following 
assessment of the polarization of the world ana its effects 
on policy under Dulles: 
In the 1950 r s John .f.i'oster Dulles haa trans-
muted this from an assumption into a dogma . The 
Dulles world rested on unitary conceptions of 
the opposing blocs: on the one hand, the Hfree 
world," capaciously defined to include such 
places as Spain, Paraguay, batista 's Cuba and 
lvdssissippi and destined ultimately for the 
private enterprise of the ~ecretary of Commerce 
ana tne god of the ~ecretary of ~tate; and, on 
the other the ncommunist camp ," a monolithic 
conspiracy with headquarters in l~J.oscow, enslaving 
captive peoples and orchestrating global crises 
according to a comprehensive master plan . l?b 
17b~chlesinger, 2£· cit ., p . 506 . 
Dulles insisted that the struggle between the 
continental powers was one of moral systems and that it 
was a struggle for continued existence of the right way 
of life . Consequently, he insisted that to be neutral 
in the struggle was to be immoral . 
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Further, in January, 1953, Dulles commented that the 
Communists sought to incite natives to revolt against the 
Western ~uropeans in their fight for independence . He thus 
directly injected the cold war issue into the future rela-
tions between the United States and the African states . l77 
Dulles fully thought that Russia was gaining much 
prestige in Africa, especially in Kenya, where the l\1au Mau 
rebellion was raging at the moment . However, a week before 
Dulles made his statement, C. 1 . Sulzberger had written in 
1he New York Times: 
-- -- -- -.-;;.--..,-. 
Communism as an ideological force is not yet 
widely understood in Africa . But, as one Negro 
remarked to this writer , "If people call it 
Communism every time we try to help ourselves, 
it causes many of us to think there must be 
something ~ood in it."l78 
177John Foster Dulles, quoted in The New York Times, 
January 28, 1953, page 8 . 
l78c . 1 . Sulzberger, dispatch from Capetown, South 
Africa for The New York Times, January 18, 1953, page 3. 
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An African opinion was expressed by Tom Mboya, the 
Kenya politician, who said that " • . • many parts of Asia 
and inaependent Africa have remained neutral in the ideo-
logical struggle between East and ~·lest . ul79 He said simply 
that Africans preferred to be listed as "don ' t know" in 
the poll of world opinion . 
The cola war was injected into the relations with 
Africa . American officials felt that they could not ais-
count the influence Russia was apparently developing in the 
continent, especially after the Afro- Asian Conference of 
1957 to wnich the Russians and Chinese were invited . lSO 
Coincidentally, 1957 was the year of the formation 
of the African Bureau in the Department of btate . 
It seems that there was a lack of common understand-
ing about the substance of the cold war . The United ~tates 
viewed it as encompassing all the world in a titanic strug-
gle which would see the emergence of one strong power domi-
nating all the rest . The Africans tended to view it as 
l79Tom J . 1~1boya , Freedom ~ After (Lonaon : Andre 
Deutsch, Limited, 1963), p . 235 . 
lSONews item in The New York 'l'imes, December 26, 
1957, page 4. 
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a struggle between two supremely strong nations in which 
the smaller nations could not afford to participate directly. 
But , it has been suggestea that the rivalry of the 
United States and ~ussia, lately also China, has been the 
"sinews" of African diplomacy . They have pitted the two 
large powers against one another, playing a dangerous game . 
Were it not for the existence and rivalry of the large 
powers, African nations would have no leverage at all in 
their diplomacy . l81 
IV • AFRICAN NA'l I GNALISl·i 
The Unitea ~tates often seems to have incorrectly 
estima~ed the nature ana strength of the nationalist 
movement in Africa . 
One mistake was to view the African pronouncements 
as reflecting a ~oviet line of thought simply because they 
sounded soffiewhat like the propaganda emanating from l·ioscow . 
The Africans were militant, non-aligned, socialistic, and 
had similar methods, goals and terms of reference . l$2 
l81R. \'L Howe , "China as tne '!rump in African Pack ," 
New Republic, 151:16, September 5, l9b4. 
l82Henry 1 . bretton , "United ~tates Foreign Policy 
'l'oward the Newly Independent States," African f..pdependence, 
Peter Judd, editor (New York : J.Jell Publishing Company, 
1962), p . 449. 
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Because the Africans sounded much like Moscow in their 
attacks on the Western Europeans in Afr ica , American policy 
was formed on the assumption that this was true . 
'l'he national movement began in 1944 as a study group . 
In 194b it became the Kenya African Union , and James Gichuru 
was the first president . Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya 
in 1947, after years of residence in Britain and travel to 
other places, including 1>'1oscow , ana was made president of 
the henya African Union . l83 
'l'he l~.~.au Iv1au uprising began in 1948 and the government 
banned numerous organizations , which were promptly replaced 
by new ones . By 1953 an article in Commonweal described the 
armed state of the settlers in Kenya, and held Jomo Kenyatta 
responsible.l84 
The fear of many was that Mau Mau was an extension of 
Russia ' s design to foment rebellion in colonial areas in order 
to benefit by the confusion . l85 And, it is true that some 
native organizations in Kenya were approvea by the Hussians . 
'l'he mistake of the United States was to confuse the voice of 
183George Bennett , "East and Central Africa , n African 
I ndependence, Peter Judd , editor (New York : Dell Publishing 
Company, l9b2), p . 39b . 
184nJomo Kenyatta , " Commonweal, 58:407- 08 , 
July 31, 1953 . 
185The New York Times, January 28, 1953, page 7 . 
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Afr ican nationalism with that of l~ioscow when they happened 
to harmonize . Cyri l Bryner, writing in Current History at 
the time said : 
But ~oviet approval has never been permanent 
endorsement . It is difficult to distinguish in 
many native leaders of these regions whether 
they are talking with the voice of lvLoscow or 
of the London School of Economics. I n any cas e, 
they speak in very personal voices . l86 
By comparing the voices of the nationalists with that 
of 1v1oscow, the United States missed many nuances that might 
have been heard there . An article in Nation, written in 
December, 1953, contained one of those notes of despair . 
~lizabeth E. Hoyt quotes a Kenya student : 
"Help to get education for the Kikuyu • • • 
Help to spread understanding of the tensions 
that torment us . You coula find a way to do 
that without offending anybody, perhaps by 
s peaking through the United Nations . Those 
ar e the important things because they are the 
foundation of everything else . nl87 
It was reported to The New York 'l'imes by C. L. 
Sulzberger that there was little Cor.~unism in Africa gener-
ally, and he stated, " •.• it is also true of Kenya, 
l86cyril Bryner, "Russia and Kenya," Current History, 
25:45, July, 1953 . 
lB7Elizabeth B. Hoyt, "Dark Road in Kenya , " Nation, 
175:550, December 13, 1962, quoting an anonymous Kenya 
student . 
where the 1•1au t.1au terrorists are giving the British colo-
nial government a great deal of trouble nl88 
But, the United ~tates temporized in the case of 
Kenya, giving support to the British because the United 
States believed that, n ••• where there is revolutionary 
smoke there must be Communist fire.nl89 
The substance of this policy was an ambivalence, 
which tried to retain the respect of both the British and 
the nationalists . 
The answer must be one that meets the needs 
of the black African and allays the fears of his 
white countryman; that gives the black what he 
is entitled to as a human being without depriv-
ing the white African of his status . l90 
American experience in relation to Tanganyika was 
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happier, probably because the circumstance was vastly 
different, in that Tanganyika was a 'l'rusteeship 'l'erritory, 
mandated to Britain under the League of Nations, and renewed 
under the United Nations, giving the worla body a strong 
voice in the administration of the territory . The United 
l88c . L. Sulzberger, dispatch from Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia for 'l'he Nevi York 'l'imes, 22:3, December 23, 1952 . 
l89rbia. 
l90nAtlantic heport on the World Today," Atlantic, 
l9b:4, December, 1955 . 
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States was given a place on the 1rusteeship Council , making 
it airectly involved in the development of Trusteeships . 
However, in 1952 , the United States voted to sustain 
the colonial government of 1'anganyika in the action 
aepriving the Wameru tribe of ancestral lands . l91 
The 1anganyika African National Union was organized 
by Julius Nyerere in 1954, out of the old Tanganyika 
African Association . l92 
1'he report of the Visiting ~dssion of the Trusteeship 
Council in late 1954 estimated that Tanganyika would be able 
to gain self- government " ••• within the present genera-
tion on the basis of a political time- table . nl93 
The question of self- government was raised again vlith-
in the Council during 195 5 and l'-'1ason Sears, United ::,tates' 
Representative , sided with Britain's view that a target date 
should not be set . The final vote was three favoring adop-
tion of the report, two rejecting it, and seven abstentions . 
Russia was one of those who abstained . l94 
191Resolution No. 648 presented to the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 10, 1952, quoted in The United 
States and vlorld Affairs, ~' Richard P . Stebbins, editor 
(New-rork: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p . 364 . 
192nAfrica: ~fuo is Safe?n Time , 83:30, Iv1arch 13 , 1964. 
l93united Nations Review, 1:39, l•1arch, 1955 . 
194United Nations Review, 1:65, l•1ay, 1955 . 
But, the weight of the Trusteeship Council was 
supporting the Africans, and in 1958 Africans were given 
representation in the Legislative Council of the Tangan-
yika Governrnent . l95 
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'l'ANU, the political party of Nyerere , was well organ-
izea by that time , and it was being financed to the extent 
that it then had a fleet of ten Land- Rover automobiles and 
had some eight hundred officials receiving salaries . l9b 
Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961, and at 
that time maintained the best of relationships with the 
United States . 
Uganda and Zanzibar were special entities which 
alreauy had highly developed governmental boaies . When 
they came to the point of indepenaence, it was merely a 
matter of the withdrawal of the British from the physical 
domain . Thus, the United States was not faced with the 
problems which she faced in regard to Kenya and Tanganyika . 
In those countries she had to decide whether she would 
support the establishment of governments where there had 
never been governments, while in Uganda and Zanzibar, the 
governmental units had existed prior to British control . 
195United Nations Review, 5:42, May, 1959 . 
196Nye, 2E · cit ., p . 101 . 
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'l'he latter 1950's saw the United ::>tates change from 
a policy which recognized British sovereignty over the 
African states, to that of support for indigenous rule.l97 
Africa was rapidly assuming the role of full partner in 
world politics . 
Slowly, the United ~tates had come to recognize 
that Nationalism , not Communism was the ideology of the 
mid-century years . 5enator J . W. Fulbright expressed the 
percept in the following words: 
Nationalism, I believe is the most pov1erful 
single force in the worla politics of the 
twentieth century, more powerful than conilllunism 
or democracy or any other system of ideas 
about social organization . l98 
V. NEU'l'RALIS~l, OR NON- ALIGNlJJ.ENT 
Having misunderstood the nature of African national-
ism in relation to the struggle between the super powers , 
the United States also misconstrued the meaning of the 
Africans when they spoke of being neutral . 
l97Hans Kohn ana Wallace ~okolsky, African Nationalism 
in the Twentieth Century {Princeton: lJ . Van Nostrana Company, 
Incorporated, 1965), p . 13 . 
l98J. \hlliam F'ulbright, Old l~lJ:ths and Ne\'1 Realities 
{New York : Random House, 1964), p . 140. 
Aside from the influence of a national tra-
aition in which the principles of equality and 
indepenaence had occupied a central place, it 
was fully realized in '~iashington that the 
emergence of new African states was altering 
~he distribution of political power in the 
world, especially in the Uni~ed Nations, in a 
manner that made it increasingly imperative 
to pay attention to African attitudes . l99 
Africans were quick to recognize the leverage they 
possessed because of the cold war, and they began to take 
aavantage of that power. The Conference of ~on-Aligned 
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Countries, held in Belgrade in l9bl, attracted ten African 
states. That conference was preceded by a preliminary 
meeting in Cairo , wnich defined a non-aligned country in 
the following way . A non- aligned country would : pursue 
independent policies of peaceful co- existence; would not 
participate in multi- lateral military alliances such as 
NATO , 0EATO, and CENTO; would support liberation and 
independence movements; would not enter into bi-lateral 
military alliances with the great powers.200 
Africa had no reason to become involved in the cold 
war . It had enough problems without restricting its 
alternatives in the international arena . Kenyatta was 
199Richard P . Stebbins (ed . ), Documents on American 
Foreign Relations , 1960 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 
1961)' p . 164 . 
200
colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (New York : Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1962), p. bO . 
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once quoted as saying, in the words of an African proverb, 
"VIhen two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers . n201 
If Africa became involved in the East-~.est struggle directly, 
then the newly independent governments would be the losers . 
1iashington and lwioscow wanted them to become involved . 
That was the policy of Dulles . He insisted that each nation 
must take part in the struggle, and not to do so was moral 
turpitude. He did not believe that one could indeed remain 
neutral . 
But , Africans insisted otherwise . Julius Nyerere 
asserted that the Africans woula indeed be able and intended 
to be neither v~estern Democrats nor Communists . 202 
Nyerere did not assert that Africans would be indif-
ferent to the developments in the international arena, rather, 
he indicated that neutrality was not the intention of Africa , 
but independence . 
'l'om 1v1boya expressed the principle in the following 
manner: 
20lrlicnard P. Steboins (ed . ) , The United ~tates in 
\Wrld Affairs, l9bl (New York : Harperana brothers, l9b2T, 
p . 239; 1'he New York Times, April 12, l9bl, page 4 . 
202Legum, ££· cit . , p . 114 . 
2u3Kohn ana bokolsky, ££· cit ., p . 17 . 
Neutralism in the foreign policy of African 
states simply means that they will not take 
sides permanently and automatically with 
either the United States or the boviet Union . 
• • • \'~e intend to decide on every interna-
tional issue on its merits . 204 
The new states are concerned about their integrity 
as states, and are guarding jealously the right to deter-
mine their own directions . Nyerere said : 
'l'he first responsibility of the government--
its first principle--is the protection of 
'l'anzania ' s independence and its freedom to 
determine its own policies, both internal and 
externa1 . 205 
This concern for the viability of tneir infant 
countries has led East Africans often to take an anti -
American attitude . ~i.any Americans have indicated dismay 
when such attitudes were expressed in official communica-
88 
tions and positions of the governments . However, Ivlr . Nyerere 
cogently explained this circumstance in an article in Africa 
Report, when he said: 
• • • until independence, the \'Jest never had 
to consider Tanzania at all . It was automatically 
"on their side . " Now they find that our support 
is not assured--and this results in an illogical 
204:zvlboya, Freedom and After, p . 23 5 . 
205Julius K. Nyerere, "'l'he Costs of Non- Alignment," 
Africa Report, Vol . 11 , 7:b2, October , l9b6 . 
belief that we have become "unfriendly." They 
have not yet accustomed themselves to the idea 
that we are independent, ana that our friend-
ship will now be genuine but our decisions will 
be our own.206 
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The Tanzanian President used the analogy of a foot-
ball game to describe his country's policy of neutrality. 
It was tne intention of Tanzania to win the game for itself. 
Tanzania has no other object in the international arena 
than that of its own security and advancement. 207 
If the ~ast African states, especially Tanzania, 
have seemed to be anti-\'lestern, the reason is that the West 
has been more involved in that area than any other power . 
Nyerere admits that Tanzanian utterances and policies have 
been hostile to the \vest on occasion, but justifies tnis by 
saying, " ••• both before and after independence, \lest-
ern countries have interfered more actively--for both good 
ana evil--in Africa than have the Eastern powers . n208 
The neutrality of the African states has led them to 
reject military alliances with all powers. They have felt 
that to allow the establishment, or continuance of bases on 
206Ibid . ' p . b3 • 
208Ibia., p . b3 . 
207Ibia., p. bl . 
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their soil would make them immediate targets in the event of 
another general war.209 Consequently, the Kenyans have 
insisted that Britain liquidate its oases on their soil, 
and the forces of the ~~est have been withdrawn from ~ast 
African soil. Such a policy has not been viewed with 
equanimity by the west, since the absence of military power 
in East Africa makes sources of strategic minerals vulner-
able in case of war with the Corrmunist states. 
One result of such a neutral policy has been that 
the \'lest has decreased its aid to that part of the world . 
And , Julius Nyerere wrote a defense of his policy in Africa 
Report saying, "If our determination to pursue this objec-
tive annoys some people who might otherwise have assisted 
us in our economic development, what are we supposed to do? 
Abandon our objective?n210 
Hecent developments in 1anzania have indicated that 
that country fully intends to remain aloof from the power 
struggle between the American and Russian governments. 
Many have thought that ~ast Africa was drifting dan-
gerously close to orbit in the Corr~unist galaxy . But , a 
number of blunders, by the Chinese in particular , have 
209zviboya, !t'reedom and After, p . 23 b . 
210Nyerere , ££• cit., p . 67. 
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indicated that the leaders of those countries have not been 
mesmerized by the Orientals . 
In August, 1965, a Chinese correspondent was expelled 
from Kenya because of his activities in the political 
arena . 211 From that point , relations between the United 
~tates and Kenya began to grow more cordial . Richard P . 
~tebbins summed up the situation in this way : 
Nowhere was this apparent reaction against 
Communist interference more noticeable than in 
Kenya, whose venerable President, Jomo Kenyatta , 
was actively engaged in curbing the pro- Communist 
maneuvers of Vice- President Oginga Odinga , • • • 
"It is naive to think there is no danger of 
imperialism from the East," Kenyatta declared . 
"In World power politics the ~ast has as much 
designs ( sic ] upon us as tne \'.est . n212 
'l'he crux of the situation arrived in the person of 
Chou en Lai , who visited Tanzania in 1965 . vfuile making an 
address in uar es Salaam, he made the mistake of saying that 
an " • • • exceedingly favorable situation for revolution 
prevails today in Africa . n213 
Kenya immediately issued a statement that she would 
avert all revolutions, for her own position was not yet 
2llnFrom Cme, 1Jiany , n Newsweek, 6b :45, August 9, 1965 . 
212Hichard P . ~tebbins (ed . ) , The United ~tates in 
\Jorld Affairs, 1965 (New York : Harper and How, 19bb) , p . 198 . 
213Newsweek, 65 :44, June 21, 19b5 . 
sec ure , and Nyerere took the t r ouble to say that his 
government ' s position was one of non- alignment with the 
Communist states as well as the \fest . 214 'l'he Chinese had 
also failed to fully appreciate the strength of the East 
African determination to remain i ndependent of the power 
blocs of the world . 
Russia, too , suffered in the eyes of the East 
Africans , when a number of students returned from fJ1oscow 
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because of the treatment that had been accorued them there , 
and because of the death of a Ghanaian student under suspi-
cious circumstances . 215 
Tom Iv1boya has declared that , nthere are already sev-
eral examples of occasions when Asian and African states 
have successfully influenced the United Nations in the inter-
ests of world peace . n216 Clearly, that is the hope of the 
1ast Africans . They wish to exert their influence upon 
the great powers and to enhance their own goals and power , 
in the hope that a third power can be made viable in the 
present power struggle. 
214Richard P . ~tebbins (ed . ) , 1he United ~tates in 
~lorld Affairs , 1..2.22. (New York : Harper ana .H.ow, l9bb), 
p. 200 . 
215rbid ., p . 199 . 
21~·'lboya, Freedom and After, p . 23b . 
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VI • COLONIALISI•1 
Perhaps nothi ng has affected the United States' 
relations with Last Africa more than the issue of colo-
nialism . Previous reference has been made to the United 
&tates 1 commitment to an anti - colonial policy. l•1ajor policy 
statements over the past twenty years frequently have indi-
cated such a stand . 'l'he question is whether the commit -
ment has always been real or merely for the record . 
The discussion of colonialism was begun as early as 
1944 when Julian Huxley wrote an article for the New 
hepublic about the colonies and freedom for dependent 
peoples . In the article , Huxley scored the United States 
because the discussion of colonialism always was in regard 
to British colonialism . He spoke of a period measured in 
decades before inaependence could be considered for the 
dependent territories of Britain . 217 
An answer to the Huxley article was made by I• .. elville 
J. Herskovits , in which he spoke of the American experience 
in the Philippines as an indication of what might be expect-
ed of depenaent peoples . He advocated 11 • • 0 freedom for 
217 Julian Huxley , "Coloni es ana lt~reeaom, 11 New 
liepublic , 110 :106, January 24 , 1944 . 
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all men and women to live their lives in their own ways , 
and in terms of those ways of life, to govern themselves . n2l$ 
Herskovits also wrote an article in 1944, for 
Foreign Affairs , in which he cited Uganda as an example of 
the ability of africans to govern themselves . Uganda was a 
standard example of the Africans ' capacity to organize them-
selves politically . Herskovits called for sincere , effec-
tive preparation of the native peoples for independence . 219 
Walter ~ulzbach , writing in the American ~cholar, 
cited the necessity of restricting the sovereignty of the 
national states of the world if conflicts were to be 
settled peaceably, and he said , "The solution of the colo-
nial problem lies in the same direction . There is no other 
choice if national liberty is to exist without the comple-
ment of international anarchy . u220 
The issue was joined before the war had ended . The 
United 0tates called for an end to colonialism in the post-
war era . Her allies insisted that there was neither moral 
nor political grounds for doing so . 0n the contrary , as has 
21$Ibid ., p . 101 . 
219I•1elville J . Herskovits, "Native .::>elf- Government, n 
Foreign Affairs, 22 :417-1$, April, 1944 . 
22~~alter ~ulsbach , "l<'uture of Colonies , " American 
.::>cholar, Vol . 13 , 1:57, January , 1944 . 
95 
already been citea, Britain and the United States were 
dependent upon the strategic metals and the strategic 
defense value of ~ast and Central Africa for the support of 
their massive production of goods . 
Because of preoccupation in Europe with Russia ' s 
threat to expand farther toward the \'lest ern Allies, '1 ruman 
ana his colleagues were not in a position to pursue the 
matter of inaepenaence for Britain ' s colonies , especially 
those of Africa . 
In 1952, the North African scene began to burn with 
the fires of rebellion . Egypt forcea the abdication of its 
king, ana revolutionaries took over the country . And Russia 
began to attack the \'lest on the colonial issue . 221 
Colin Legum has written: 
'l'wo important events intervenea between the last 
Pan- African Congress (1945) and the first Con-
ference of Independent African ~tates (1958) • 'l'he 
first was Egypt ' s February 23rd Revolution (1952) 
which marks the breakthrough of modern Arab 
nationalism; the second was the Bandung Conference 
{1955) which was symptomatic of Asia ' s arrival on 
the world scene . 222 
22l'l'he New York Times, February 3, 1952, page 3 . 
222 Legum, ££ · cit ., p . 39 . 
96 
These two events heralded the entr ance of former 
colonial states into the world arena . After this time 
the newer states could be ignored no longer. The West 
was forced to accept and evaluate their judgment of world 
affairs . The weapon of the newly independent countries was 
the United Nations . The new states were admitted to member-
ship in the organization and proceeded to make it do their 
bidding, as evaluated by the Council on Foreign Relations: 
The primary function of the United Nations, 
in the eyes of its founders, had been the adjust-
ment of disputes among individual states, not 
the accomodation of a quasi - revolutionary move-
ment which in fact was sweeping over half a 
world and respected neither political boundaries 
nor legal and administrative forms . 223 
The Charter of the United ~ations was filled with 
iaealistic statements which promised equal rights and self-
aetermination, and was interpreted by the newer nations to 
mean that foreign rule over aependent peoples would have to 
be brought to an end . 224 
Subjugated people of the world were uniting and they 
were aetermined that colonialism would end . That determina-
tion was not lost on the Unitea States, for the African 
223Hichard P . Stebbins (ed . ), The United ~tates in 
World Affairs , ~ (New York: harper ana brotners, 1953), 
p . 352 . 
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Bureau was created in 1957, in response to the evident need 
to establish contact with the African states themselves , 
rather than conauct future business through the European 
sections of the btate Department . 
President ~isenhower indicated 1960 as the year of 
real re- evaluation, saying : 
In early 1960 , when the in<iependence move-
ment really began to snowball , it became 
obvious that our traaitional policy of refrain-
ing from involvement in areas consiaerea to be 
under the hegemony of other nations had to be 
re- examined . 225 
'lhy tne re - examination aia not take place sooner was 
not explained by Eisennower , for in his secona inaugural 
speech in 1957, the President saia , concerning the colonies , 
"There harshly blow the winds of change . n226 However, the 
Unitea btates was reluctant to abandon the status guo , in 
aealing with the dependent states , until 1960 . 
Henry Cabot Lodge manifested the changed attitude 
of the Uni~ed ~tates in his participation in the ~ecurity 
Council debate, even at the risk of arousing the ire of 
friendly nations , such as the Union of ~outn Africa . 227 
225.r.:isenhovfer, v/aging Peace : 1.2..2..2.- 61, p . 572 . 
226Ibid ., p . 103 . 
227Richard P . Stebbins (ea . ) , The United ~tate s in 
World Affairs, 1960 (New York : harper ana brothers, l9bl), 
p . 164; United Nations Review, ~a) 30, l9b0, pp . 851- 52 . 
In gearing its policy to broad support of 
African nationalist aspirations, the United 
~tates faced hazards potentially more serious 
than the alienation of some tens of thousands 
of white East Africans . 228 
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Included in the risks assumed in supporting the anti-
colonialism of the Africans was the possibility that they 
would align themselves with the Communist bloc , or that they 
would deny the ·~Jest access to their rich stores of raw 
materials . 
However, before it is concluded that the policy of 
the United ~tates had taken a complete turn about , it should 
be notea that in regard to the resolution presented to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in December , l 9b0 , 
the United ~tates abstained from voting . The following 
excerpt from Schlesinger 1 s book, A 'l'housand Days, is 
enlightening : 
Our delegation even had the concurrence of 
the ~tate De partment in \'Jashington in its desire 
to vote for the resolution . But the British were 
opposed , and Harold l~1acmillan called .t:isenhower 
by transatlantic telephone to request American 
abstention . When an instruction to abstain 
arrived from the White House, James J . \'ladsworth, 
then our ambassador to the ill~, tried to reach 
~isenhower to argue the case . ~isenhower 
aeclinea to accept his call . \\adsworth loyally 
defended the American abstention in the General 
Assembly .229 
228Richard P. 5tebbins (ed . ) , The United States in 
\'iorla Affairs , l9ol (New York: Harper and Hrothers, l9o2j, 
p . 248 . 
229~chlesinger , ££• cit ., p . 510 . 
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Such a performance, after the President had appeared before 
the Assembly to present a plan for the aid of the African 
states, hardly testified to a change of policy with regard 
to colonialism.230 
Of much significance also was the fact that in the 
debate Khruschev demanded the immediate liquidation of colo-
nial holdings, and the Soviet Union was listed as voting 
in the affirmative on the resolution, while the United States 
and eight other non-Communist states abstained . 23l 
Additionally, the United States abstained on an 
African resolution which called for the recognition of 
Africa as a "denuclearized zone .n232 
John F. Kennedy brought a new interest to the govern-
ment concerning Africa . He took the first opportunity to 
reverse the impression made in December, 1960, by the 
Eisenhower Administration . The resolution on Angola gave 
him a chance, ana shortly afterward he expressed verbally 
his sympathy for the people of Africa in their struggle. 233 
230Bretton, ££· cit., p . 460. 
231Richard P . Stebbins (ed . J , The United btates in 
World Affairs, l9b0 (New York: Harper and brothers, 1961), 
p. 35b; United Nations Review , January, l9bl, pp. b-9. 
232Richard P . Steboins (ed . ), The United btates in 
World Affairs, l9bl (New York : Harper and Brothers, 19o2T, 
p . lOb . 
233~chlesinger, ££• cit., p . 55b . 
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Schlesinger gave this opinion of Kennedy's view of 
colonialism: " ••• Kennedy saw it as inherently non-
genteel and probably inseparable from disorder, excess and 
a certain bitterness toward the v.est . n 234 In his view, to 
strengthen the African states would be to preserve the 
favorable attitudes of the governments of the new states, 
whether or not they accepted the system of the United 
States . 235 Khruschev taunted Kennedy about American policy 
in regard to colonialism . He suggested that Kennedy ' s 
policy was uneven and timid and that: 
• • • it might endorse anti - colonialism for 
tactical reasons, but its heart was with the 
colonialists . Why not adopt the Soviet policy 
of tolerance and non-interference?236 
American influence had a part in the demise of 
colonialism . In many ways , official ana private, inten-
tional and unintentional, iaealistic and selfish, the 
United States has presented the picture of a state which 
is opposed to the foreign rule of any people . 
However, no matter what the American con-
tribution may have been, American foreign 
policy conduct over the years appears to have 
been more responsive to the facts of United 
234Ibid . , p . 508 . 
236rbid . , p . 364 . 
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~tates domestic and of international politics 
than to humanitarian, idealistic goals . 237 
Probably, there is nothing more deflating to an 
American than to discover that his government has been and 
is now following a policy that is dictated by sheer politics 
rather than by high idealism . 
VII . AFRICAN 80CIALISiv1 
Socialism, regardless of its qualifying word, is not 
a well respected concept in the United &tates . Because of 
this, there has been an attitude of suspicion when the 
Africans speak of their own peculiar brand of Socialism . 
The contrast between traditional African society and 
the modern industrial society of the Y.est is striking . As 
fuboya has observed, the acquisitive instinct in the ~est 
has been responsible for many of the excesses to be found 
there , and this acquisitive instinct is largely lacking 
within the traditional African society . 238 
Barbara uiJard, writing in 'l'he New York 'l'imes in 1952, 
stated that u ••• hitherto, the transfer of wealth to 
237Bretton, ££· cit . , p . 444 . 
23Br.rlboya, Freedom and After, p. 163 . 
other areas has been thought of almost exclusively in 
terms of profit.n239 
Julius Nyerere has pointed out the genius of the 
African society: 
Traditionally we lived as families, with 
individuals supporting each other and helping 
each other on terms of equality . \'~e recog-
nized that each of us had a place in the com-
munity, and this place carried with it rights 
to whatever food ana shelter was available in 
return for the use of whatever abilities and 
energies we had . The old, and the sick, or 
those whose crops had been destroyed by natural 
disasters, were not left alone in their 
suffering . 240 
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Nyerere recognized the difficulty involved in trans-
ferring the traditional values to the modern social organiza-
tion, yet, he apparently intends to try to retain the pur-
pose of the traditional society saying: 
• • • The purpose remains the same as in 
the traditional society. That is, the wel-
fare of every individual in the context of 
the needs of the society of which he is a 
member . 24l 
The fear of the Capitalist society that 5ocialism pro-
duces laziness is countered by the citation of an old 
239Barbara Ward, "The Jv~.oral Issue Thrust Upon Us," 
The New York Times , December 28, 1952, page 6 . 
240Nyerere, QQ• cit., p. 67 . 
2411b . . ~-
103 
African proverb which says, 1fJvlgeni siku mbili; siku Y2 tatu 
mpe jembe,n (Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on 
the third day give him a hoe) . 242 
The land is a crucial point in the African concept, 
for it is the one source of wealth for the great majority 
of the population . Contrasted with the vlestern view of 
land as personal property, the African traditional society 
is undeniably egalitar ian . 243 Any member of the society has 
available to him the means of subsistence . He cannot be 
denied that right so long as he is a responsible partici-
pant in the group life . 244 ~boya has said that: 
The practice of African bocialism involves 
trying to use what is relevant and good in 
these African customs to create new values in 
the changing world of the money economy, to 
build an economy which reflects the thinking 
of the great majority of the people . Few 
Africans are so Westernized and de- tribalized 
that these attitudes no longer have their 
hola on them . 245 
In the effort to establish viable states in areas 
that are united by tenuous national feelings, the African 
statesmen are seeking to utilize the traditional social 
organization, which is socialistic, to promote the feeling 
242Mboya, Freedom and After, p . lb3 . 
243rbid . , p . 164 . 
245rbid . , p . lb7 . 
244rbid . , p . lb3 . 
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of commonality . 'I'his is called "familyhoodn by Nyerere 
and may be found in varying definitions in the statements 
of other apologists of the African cause . 246 
That the concept of African Socialism is greatly 
different from Western Capitalism is not questioned . 
Nyerere has made the contrast in very strong terms . 247 
But , it is pointed out by 'I' om :Mboya that African 3ocialism 
is also unlike guropean Socialism . 248 These men are saying 
that they are trying to organize African life in a pecul-
iarly African way, not patterned on life in other areas of 
the world . 
Julius Nyerere has expressed the aim of the African 
leaders: 
We need to live harmoniously among ourselves; 
we need to safeguard our society; we need to re-
spect ourselves and deserve the respect of others . 
These things are equally important . "~lan does not 
live by bread alone . n24~ 
Z46Ibid . , p . 168 . 
248rbid . , p . 167 . 
247Ibid ., p . lb9 . 
249N "t 67 yerere, ££· £!_ . , p . • 
VIII . THE ONE- PARTY ~'l'ATE 
Most of the new African states have adopted a one-
party political system . \'lith a few notable exceptions, 
they have seen fit to either continue the single party 
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which brought them to independence, or to unite all parties 
into one national party after independence has been 
achieved . 25° 
Western leaders have been critical of the single-
party system because it seems inconsistent with the concept 
of democracy which they cherish . They have argued that it 
gives rise to dictatorships which will not allow the forma-
tion of opposition parties, or, at best, will not allow 
them to function as true oppositions . 251 
President Nyerere has entered a plea for under-
standing of the difficulties involved in consolidating the 
fruits of independence, and asking for time to develop the 
institutions of political life necessary for the function-
ing of a modern state . 252 
25~ . Gray Cowan, The Dilemmas of African Independence 
(~ew York : Walker and Company, l9b4J, p . 7 . 
251Ibia . , p . 8 . 
252Julius K. Nyerere, 11 Africa l\leeds Time," The New 
York 'l'imes lvlagazine, l~1arch 27, 1960, p . 19 . 
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"African arguments supporting the single- party system 
are based on both pragmatic and theoretical grounds . n253 
African leaders claim that a strong po·wer is needed in the 
initial stages of independence , and that there is no necessity 
for multi- party arrangements in order to maintain democracy . 
Also , Sulzberger obse rved, "Democracy, as defined in terms 
of the present broad world cleavages, has provided no 
answers other than shibboleths . n254 
lvlboya presented the follO\'ling argument to support 
the claim of Africans that they do maintain democracy : 
A government which gives all citizens the 
right to vote , the right to contest elections 
ana the right to express themselves freely 
inside and outside of parliament is not 
undemocratic . 255 
Mboya also says that the opposition parties must 
develop naturally , out of the issues which present them-
selves to the country , not because the political science 
textoooks say so . 256 'l'he Africans are well aware of the 
253cowan, loc . cit . 
254c . 1 . ~ulzberger, dispatch from Capeto\'m, 3outh 
Africa for 'l'he New York Times, January lS , 1953, page 3 . 
255'l'on1 J . !•J.boya, "Party System ana Democracy in 
Africa," F.oreign Affairs, 4l:b58, June, l9b3 . 
256r.egum, .QE. · cit . , p . l23 . 
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length of time it has required to develop the political 
institutions of the West , and that those institutions are 
still developing . Therefore, they do not accept the \Jest -
ern definition of democracy , which seems to require simply 
more than one party . 257 
Nyerere has said that an opposition party is a matter 
of indifference , because it will not affect the free discus-
sion of the issues , or the equality found in that freedom 
of discussion . 258 
Accordi ng to Nyerere, the substance of democracy is 
freedom of discussion and equality among those who partici-
pate . 259 If these are maintained , then democracy is a fact, 
even though a political opposition may not be organized . 
'l'he Western structure is considered alien to African soci-
ety and incompatible with its goals and psychology . 200 
The question for the United States is whether it can 
accept a definition of democracy which runs counter to 
popular concepts, in the special case of Africa . The matter 
seems to cause no difficulty in regard to other countries 
such as Portugal , Spain, and the South American countries . 
257cowan, 2.£ · cit . , p . 9 . 
258Legum, 2.£ · cit . , p . 123 . 
259rbia ., p. 122. 
26°cowan , 2.£ · cit . , p . 11 . 
______./ 
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Further, will reaction to the African concepts of democracy 
adversely affect American aid to those new countries? 
IX . CONCLUSION 
The foregoing are some of the issues which have 
affected the relationships between the East African 
countries , especially Tanzania, and the United States . 
The United States has been sensitive to these 
matters thr oughout the per iod discussed here . And , the 
sensitivity of the government to the possibility of African 
support or rejection has caused relations to become 
strained at times . A careful inquiry into the significance 
of African ideas and customs might aid in the establishment 
of more harmonious relationships with East African govern-
ments . 
) 
CHAPTER V 
THE ECCJ1~0Iv1IC FAC'l'vRS 
The waning days of \'lorld ~~ar II saw the United ~tates 
faced with a formiaable economic problem. How could the 
government prevent the collapse of the economy when the 
heavy demand upon its proauctive facilities by war no longer 
existed?2bl The country was faced with the necessity of 
converting the economy from wartime production to a 
peacetime basis . 
A solution to the problem began while the war still 
was in progress . The administration viewed the problem as 
one of prime importance . 2o2 The obvious answer lay in 
securing foreign markets for the produce of the economy . 
'!'his meant that a liberalization of world trade would have 
to be effected and the f r ee flow of goods allowed . 2b3 
Alvin W. Hansen suggested three means to achieve a 
balance in international trade and production : 
Z61J . Fred Rippy, "Historical Perspective," Foreign 
Aid Re - examined, James ~4 . v.iggins and Helmut 0choeck, 
eaitors hJashington : Public Affairs Press, 195$), p . $ . 
Z62Ibid . 
263Ibia . 
The main means to achieve international equi-
librium are (a) the promotion of full employment 
in the industrially mature countries, and espe-
cially in the United btates, (b) the development 
and industrialization of the backward countries 
designea to change the structure of their econo-
mies , and (c) a liberalization of commercial and 
tariff policies throughout the world , and nota-
bly in the United ~tates . 2b4 
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Hansen also suggested that the end of the war signal-
led a change in the economic relationships of the nations of 
the w6rld . He asserted that the old routine of exchanging 
raw ma~erials for the finished product would end ana a new, 
complex trade between highly diversified economies would 
emerge . 265 
An international conference was called in 1~44 for 
the purpose of dealing with the post -war economic problen1 . 
The Bretton-~oods Conference dealt with the necessity of 
the United ~tates, and other countries, to maintain the 
export sectors of their economies . 26b 
Bankers objected to the establishment of the Interna-
tional l>!onetary J.i'und, v1hich would maintain an equilibrium 
among the industrial nations of the world . They charged 
2b4Alvin H. Hansen, Amer1ca'~ Rol~_ in the World 
l!:conomy (New York: .. . , •• Norton and Company, 1945j, p . 30. 
2b6liippy, ££· cit ., p . 10 . 
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that such an organization would introauce lending methods 
which were not in keeping with accepted credit principles . 2b7 
While the bankers aid not object to the United States play-
ing a role in the international economy, they did have some-
thing to say about the methods used in performing that role . 
'l'he primary concer n of the planners in the last stages 
of the war was the ability of the United ~tates and Britain 
to maintain their posi~ions in the production and trade of 
the world . 2b8 
Adolf A. Berle , jr . has suggested that the United 
~tates had three alternatives in the post -war economic world . 
One was to persuade the government to conquer as much terri -
tory as was necessary for tne purpose . Another was to enter 
into direct competition for sources of raw materials and 
markets . 'l'he third , and feasible one , was to enter into 
cartels with the Buropeans in the allocation of raw materi -
als and markets . 269 
The last of these suggestions is the one adopted by 
international businessmen, because it was necessary . 
267nbretton-Woods C.onference," Time, 45:86, 
February 12 , 1945 . ----
268~ • .B . Harris, "broader Issues of Bretton-Woods," 
New Republic, 111:125- 28, July 31 , 1944 . 
269 Adolf A. berle, Jr . , 'l'he 'l'wentieth Centu_ry 
Capitalist Revolution (New York : Harcourt , brace ana 
C.ompany, 1954), pp . 120- 21 . 
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But, the government frowned upon such activity, ana pro -
hibited the format-ion of such organizations in the domestic 
sector, which sug6ests an ambivalence on the part of the 
government . Domestically it diu not allow the practices 
which it condoned, of necessity, abroad . 
becretary of State Baward R. btettinius said, in his 
report to President 1 ruman after the San I<'rancisco confer-
ence, that economic prosperity for the United States involved 
restoration of other economies of the world . 270 
1'he policy of the United States then began to point 
to the assistance of other governments . By strengthening 
the economies of other states, the United ~tates would be 
strengthening her own economy . President Truman justified 
h~program of aid with the assertion that a two per cent 
rise in living standards in Asia anci Africa would keep 
Western industry booming for a century . 27l 
Three external forces raised the sensitivity of the 
United ~tates to events in the world economy . They were 
the boviet- bloc rivalry, the intervention of the less 
270R· 't 10 ~ppy, 2E· £1_ . , p . • 
271Truman, l94b-2..?_, Years of 'l'rial and Hope, p . 275 . 
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developed nations in international relations , and the 
strong competition of vie stern i!;urope and Japan . 272 
The phenomenon callea "~oviet effect" was noticeable 
throughout the post-war era . 273 The results of the reaction 
to boviet action were seen in every area of economics : 
In the sphere of United ~tates foreign policy 
in particular , ~oviet-bloc rivalry dominated ~he 
magnituae ana airection of the government ' s 
foreign aid program , totaling almost ~73 billion 
oetween mid - 1945 and the end of 1959 . 274 
~o, the policy of the Unitea ~tates was based on at 
least two principles . One was the need to strengthen the 
export sector of the economy by aiding other economies . 
The other was the reaction to the ~oviet initiative . 
\fuatever the motives may have been, the policy of 
the government in the post- war world was to allow American ........ __ _ 
capital to flow out to the rest of the world, particularly 
~urope, in order that those countries might become importers 
of United btates gooas . In this way the United States became 
an exporting nation rather than an importing nation . 275 
272Harold G. Vatter, 1he U. ~ . ~conomy in th~ 1950 ' s 
(Nevv York: \L \'i. Norton and Company, 19o3), p . 17 . 
273Ibid . , p . 2)$ . 
275Ibid ., p. 20 . 
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Interest in Africa developed along with the normal 
interest in overseas investment . The United States had 
always had a sizeable interest in ~outh Africa, and the 
export of capital caused outflows of money to that country 
as well as other areas that were of strategic importance or 
were promising fields for investment. 276 Also, it was recog-
nized that the very size of American businesses made them 
determinative in the economies of other nations. 277 
vfuen ~isenhower became President the ideology did 
not change . He conunents: 
" \'lhen shallow critics denounce the profit 
motive inherent in our system of private 
enterprise, they ignore the fact that it is 
the economic support of every human right 
w~ssess and that without it all rights 
~uld soon disappear . u278 
Harold G. Vatter makes this statement: 
Review of American foreign policy in the 1950's 
has revealed a persistent conflict between historic 
mercantilistic drives and a new sensitivity to the 
economic needs of other nations. lv!orality and 
utopian notions of selflessness aside, it is 
276"Africa ~outh of the ~ahara ," Nation, 177:557, 
December 26, 1953 . 
277Berle, 2£• cit . , p . 119 . 
278Dwight D. iisenhower, quoted in The New York 
Times, January 13, 1952, page 5 . 
difficult not to see the mercantilistic con-
siderations in every ruajor aspect of policy . 279 
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Materialism is inherent in capitalism. There is no 
way by which the system may be anything else, in its present 
form. The surprising thing is that so few Americans seem 
to recognize that they are materialistic. The materialistic 
outlook is readily evident to foreigners who come to this 
country, however . One stuaent from Kenya has comrr1ented that 
American fear of Communism was based on the assumption that 
it would take away their wealth and possessions . He further 
stated: 
\ihenever I have b een given a ride to the 
college by my fellow students I am asked, "Do 
yotyi.ike cars?" or "Do you have many cars in 
Kenya?" or nWhat type of houses do you live 
in?" or "Do you like TV?" To me there is 
nothing wrong with asking these questions 
except that they reveal the kind of things 
you live for. Nobody has yet asked me how 
we are trying to develop Kenya or what 
Kenya's real needs are as she approaches the 
day of her inaependence.2SO 
The United States proceeded to build up a prodigious 
economic capacity. And, coupled with the productive 
279vatter, ££• cit., p . 279. 
2g0Amos Kiriro, "An African Student .:,tudies Us," 
The New York 1imes Jl.iagazine, lJecember 10, 1961, p. 16. 
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capacity of other nations of the world, mankind had the 
resources and the power to wipe poverty from its miast . 2Bl 
Near the ena of his tenure as President, ~isenhower 
began to stress the need of Africa south of the Sahara, 
and to make provision for the development of that area in 
the foreign aia enactments of Congress . He proposed, in 
1960, a special allocation of ~20 million to initiate a 
program of education and training in the southern part of 
Africa . 2g2 
The Unitea btates realized its mistake in unaer-
estimating the virulence of the national movements in Africa. 
Now it began a concerted effort towara regaining the confi-
dencer the new states . As Nyerere said, the lJnited States 
had missed its opportunity in regard to the freedom move-
ments, but it could still claim opportunities in the 
economic field.283 
'l'hat the economic policy of the United States was 
airected toward the enhancement of i~s own position seems 
clear. DeVere E. Pentony has remarkea: 
2Slvatter, QE. cit . , p . l . 
282H.ichard P . ~teboins ( ed . 1, '!'he Unitea btates 1.n 
\tlorla .ri.ffairs, 1960 (New York: Harperand brotners, l9oiT, 
p. 169 . 
ZS3Ibid . 
The economic interests of the United ~tates 
in the growth of the less developed members of 
the Free \'lorld community are real, but probably 
not critical, in relation to the total size of 
our economy . Nevertheless, development of a 
part of the world containing over a billion 
people who now produce and consume too little 
could hardly fail to add to the size of our 
foreign trade, perhaps to increase it considerably. 
It should also enrich American lives by increas-
ing the variety of gooas in our markets,and by 
increasing opportunities for work and travel 
abroad . 284 
117 
0chlesinger has saia that by 1960 the foreign aid 
policy of the United ~tates had stagnated, both in its 
concepts and programs . 285 The Kennedy Administration set 
out to remedy the situation, as it conceived the problem . 
Kennedy is quoted by &chlesinger: 
"The funaamental task of our foreign aia 
program in the 1960's is not negatively to 
fight communism: its fundamental task is to 
h~ake a historical demonstration that in 
the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth--
in the southern half of the globe as in the 
north--economic growth and political democracy 
can develop hand in hand. 11286 
Kennedy asserted that the goal of American aid to 
the African states should not be to make them pawns in 
2B4ueVere B. ~entony (ed . ) , The Underdeveloped Lands: 
A Dilemma of the International Bcon'OniY (~an .B'rancisco: 
Chandler Publishing Company, l9b0), p . 22. 
285 Arthur lv1 . ~chlesinger, Jr ., A 'l'housana Days 
(Boston: Houghton 1~1ifflin Company, 1965), p . 586 . 
286John F . l\.enneay, quotea by Arthur lv1 . :Jchlesinger, 
Jr ., in A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Iv1ifflin Company, 
l9b5), p. 592 . 
the cold war . He felt that the cola war angle had been 
overemphasized as the only apoarent way to persuade Con-
gress to vote necessary funas . 287 ~ignificant, however, 
· is ti"1e fact that funas for foreign aid declined during 
Kennedy ' s Administration . 288 
The enlightening report of the Clay Cor.~ittee , 
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which investigated the activities of the Agency for Inter-
national Development , reveals the extent to which the 
( 
United ~tates government was corrmi~ted 1 to the profit 
motive . ~chlesinger remarks : 
• . • Buried in tne r eport was a systematic 
hostility to forms of development which did not 
yiela private profit . 1~1ost of the changes it 
proposea were intended to promote American 
private investment . borne abroad read t he docu-
ment as a sta~ement of the thesis that the point 
of foreign aid was to facilitate the penetration 
of the developing world by American business . 289 
Perhaps most reveal ing of all is the statement made 
by G. l'•1ennen \'iilliams in 1964 : 
When our AID program provides a bull aozer, 
or a shipload of wheat from our farm surplus , the 
story does not end at that point . The first ship-
ment may be paid for by a grant or a l oan 
Z87'l'he New York 'l'imes , July 6 , 1959 , page 26 . 
288~chlesinger , 2£• cit ., p . 599 . 
289rbid . , p . 598 . 
provided by the U. ~ . taxpayer. But bull-
dozers need spare parts and must be replaced 
one day, and telecommunication networks are 
often extended. Even dietary habits may 
change through increased use of American 
food products . New tastes and needs for 
American products can lead to new commercial 
sales, and this development can be an impor-
tant end result of our AID program around the 
world.290 
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Then , the economic policy of the United ~tates since 
1945 has had as its goals the rebuilding of European 
economies, the establishment of a sound economy in newly 
independent states, the isolation and weakening of the 
boviet Union, ana the enhancement of its own economy.291 
'l'his study is now concerned with the directions this 
policy took in the years since 1945, particularly in rela-
tion to East Africa. 
I. THE DIIiliCTIONS OF UNIT.r;D STATES' bCONOMIC POLICY 
The N~rshall Plan, which provided for rebuilding the 
war-ravaged areas of Europe, met with great success. As the 
effectiveness of the plan continued, the administration began 
290a. 1~1ennen vlilliams, "New Patterns of African 'lrade," 
Department of State Bulletin , 50:b68, April 27, 1964. 
291Rippy, ££• cit., p . 1. 
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to look for new areas of penetration . Greece was aided in 
1947 in her fight against the Communist effort to take over 
the country, and Turkey also received aid . 292 
Additionally, the International l•ionetary Fund was in 
operation by 1947, dealing only with non-Co~nunist member 
governments and their banks . 293 This fund allowed govern-
ments faced with financial difficulty to draw upon the 
resources of the other member countries when feasible . 
In 1949 'l'ruman proposed a plan for aiding countries 
in economic distress . 'l'he fourth point of his plan commit-
ted him to a program of direct aid to the underdeveloped 
countries of the world . 294 'l'he plan called for exportation 
of surplus capital that had been accumulating . 295 Under 
the program, implemented June 5 , 1950, and called simply 
"Point Four,n296 the United ::>tates carried the cold war 
to the &oviets with confidence that the American system 
would prevail and that stable political systems would 
292'1'ruman, l2b:..Q_-.2£, Years of Trial and. Hope, p . 265 . 
293vatter, £E· cit . , p . 276. 
294Truman , ~-2£, Years of Trial ~Hope, p . 269 . 
295Ibid ., p . 268 . 
296Ibid . , p . 271 . 
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be established in the newly independent states. Those gov-
ernments were expected to be friendly to the United 
States.297 
Point Four fulfilled the expectations of the Truman 
Administration. He remarked in January, 1952: 
This is Point Four-- our Point Four program at 
work . It is working--not only in Inaia--but in 
Iran, in Paraguay and Liberia--in thirty-three 
countries arouna the globe . Our technical 
missionaries are out there . we need more of 
them . ~·,e need more funds to speed their 
efforts, because there is nothing of greater 
importance in our foreign policy . There is 
nothing that shows more clearly what we 
stand for and what we want to achieve . 298 
In the same month this statement was made, \/alter 
Van Kirk told a group of missionary executives that Point 
Four was being diverted from its humanitarian aims and was 
being used for military purposes and for cold war 
strategy . 299 
In ~larch, 1952, Truman submitted a request to the 
Congress for ~5,350,000,000 for foreign aid . Of that amount 
~4,070,000,000 was to go to Western Europe for weapons . 
'l'he Middle East and Africa were allotted ~b5b,OOO,OOO in 
297Ibid ., p . 276 . 
298The New York 'l'imes, January 10, 1952, page 16 . 
299The New York Tim~, January b, 1952, page 15. 
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technical aia and other as&istance . In making his request, 
1ruman cited the danger of Comntunist penetration, but he 
also said that the United ~tates was dependent on foreign 
sources of raw materials . 300 
~evera1 versions of international cooperation organi-
zations were brought forward in the succeeding years . 'lhe 
.t:conomic Cooperation administration, 1948- 51, The l•1utual 
~ecurity Administration, 1951, The Foreign Operations 
Administration in 1953 and The International Cooperation 
Administration in 1955 all carried forward the initial 
goals of the foreign aid programs . 301 
'lhe 1-mtual becurity Administration attempted to 
emphasize investment in the less aeveloped areas of the 
world, but enaed with the preponderance of its funds 
invested in Western ~urope .3°2 
The l•mtual becurity Administration included 
military goals within its guidelines . Ostensibly , the aim 
of the ~ . S. A. was to strengthen the economies of the 
recipients. Basil Davidson pointed out in 1952 t hat: 
3°0The New York Times , ~~rch 7, 1952, page 1. 
3°1 s hl · ·t 586 c es1nger , 2E• £!_., p . • 
3°2vatter, QE. cit ., p . 269 . 
• • • though large sums are being spent 
through the 11/mtual Security Administration and 
other agencies to oromote certain kinds of 
industry in colonial territories , such spend-
ing is being presented to the world as a con-
tribution to the development of backward areas; 
in reality it is merely imperialism in a new 
form .303 
Harold G. Vatter makes the point that after the 
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foreign aid organization had been converted from the Economic 
~ooperation Agency to the Mutual Security Agency, foreign 
aid became more concerned with military aid than before . 
Throug~952 military aia amounted to some ~6 bilJion, while 
1953 - bO saw the amount rise to some :p24 billion . The total 
aid amounts remained rather stable .304 
Assistance was notably small for underdeveloped areas 
of the world; most of the aid given by tne United States 
still went to Burope . 305 
American interest in Africa centered around the fact 
that vital raw materials were obtained from Central Africa 
and strategic metals from mines in East Africa . 3°6 
303Basil Davidson , "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms," 
Nation , 175 :209- 10 , September 13, 1952 . 
304vatter , ££· cit ., p . 271 
306~ . B. Fay, "United ~tates Interest in Africa , 11 
Current History , 25:47- 51, July , 1953 . 
124 
Because Africa was a politically sensitive area, and 
demanding recognition , the United States felt it could 
extend certain forms of aid ana encouragement . In so doing, 
the vulnerable new countries might be saved from Communism, 
and the vital materials ana territory saved for the West . 307 
In a message to Congress in 1956 President ~isenhower 
indicated that it was especially important to encourage 
forces friendly to the United btates , and for that reason he 
asked Congress to extend aid for certain programs in 
Africa .3°8 
Toward the end of the 1950's the geographical dis-
tribution of non- military aid shifted from the European 
area to less developed areas . It then began to center 
on the areas which were strategic mili~arily , but were 
woefully underdeveloped , and whose costs of development 
were rising precipitously .3°9 
The value of economic assistance was recognized 
by those who were coming to power in ~ast Africa . Mboya, 
writing in Atlantic in 1959, sanctioned American aid and 
3°7cyril Bryner, "Russia and Kenya," Current 
History, 25 :43, July, 1953, p . 43 . 
308Dwight D. ~isenhower, Public Papers of the 
Presidents, 1.22..2. (\'•ashington : Government Printing Office , 
1958) , p . 319 . 
309vatter, 2E · cit . , p . 271 . 
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admitted that the capital and technical skills for develop-
ment of the African economies had to come from abroad . 310 
\'ihile some American aid ·was being sent to the newly 
independent states, most of the money was going to those 
countries which had been self-governing for a long time, 
or which had peculiar interest for the United States .3ll 
Reflecting the reluctance of the Unitea States to 
enter the new nations with massive aid, the Eisenhower 
Administration called upon ~uropeans to continue support-
ing the countries of Africa that haa once been their colonial 
territories.312 However, as 19b0 ushered in a great number 
of new states, the United States offered to assist them . 
President Kennedy promised that Tanganyika woula receive 
~10 million as a loan, as well as assistance in a three-
year development plan . 313 The actual figure amounted to 
:p6 . 2 million.Jl4 
310Tom J . l•1boya, "African Revolution," Atlantic, 
203:44, April, 1959 . 
311Henry L. Hretton, "United btates Foreign ~olicy 
'l'oward the Newly Independent ~tates," African lnaependence 
Peter Juda, editor (New York : Dell Publishing Company, 
l9b2), p . 456 . 
312 . . Vatter, ££ · c~t ., p . 18 . 
313Hichard P. ~teboins (ed . ), The United States in 
~Jorla Affairs, 19bl {New York : Harper and Brothers , l9b2}, 
p . 275 . 
314I•1boya, Freedom and After, p. 241. 
The Kennedy years saw an increased interest in 
Africa, but, the continent continued to receive scant 
attention as comparea with the rest of the world . 315 
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And, the United ~tates was warned that it must not expect 
the recipients of aia to accept it with no qualifications 
in the terms of agreement .316 
lJlboya, too, sounded a warning note to the United 
States in regard to what it might expect to gain from the 
money it expendea in ~ast Africa: 
I believe that in the past the Americans gave 
aid in expectation of friendship and even of 
political support . But increasingly they are 
becoming aware that such a process brings them 
in return resentment, rather than frienaship . 
'l'he change in American attitudes over aid has 
come because the numoer of independent states 
has grown and the voice of the colonial powers, 
find1ng an echo in the United Sta~es, has become 
weaker . Like everyone else, the Americans have 
now haa to come to grips with the real Africa, 
meeting and negotiating with African leaders, 
rather than doing business through the British 
and french . 317 
The expectation of many is that the future is where 
American economic interest lies . As Africa develops it 
3l5Richard P. 0tebbins (ed . ), The United ~tates in 
\'lorld .Affairs, 1.2£2.. (New York: harper and How, 196b J, 
p . 192 . 
3lbrtelen Kitchen, "Africa and the Kennedy Era," Nevr 
Republic, 143:17- 19, December 12, 19bu . 
3171v1boya, Freeaom and After, p . 241. 
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will require American goods in ever increasing volume, and 
the demand for African raw materials will correspondingly 
increase . 3l$ 
Clearly, then, american economic policy was centered 
in aiding the economies of the underdeveloped countries of 
the world, in the hope that such aid would block their drift 
toward a communistic society and that it would create new 
demands for Western gooas and services, which would enhance 
the Western economy . 
II . AID TO EAST AFH.ICA 
1'he strategic importance of East Africa in the event 
of another world conflict has already been alluded to in 
Chapters I and III , and that impor~ance is readily seen when 
the corr~unications facilities of ~ast and Central Africa are 
traced on a map . 
~he region contains the major portions of the stra-
tegic and precious metals being produced by the continent, 
and it affords the principle facilities for shipping those 
metals to ports accessible to the \'lest without passing 
through ~uez and the Mediterranean ~ea . 
318Andrew 1vJ. . Karmarck , "The African ~conomy and Inter-
national 'l'rade, 11 in 'l'he United States and Africa, \•!alter 
Goldschmidt , editor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, l9b3), 
p . 159 . 
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One is not surprised to learn of the l•1ay, 1953 , 
establishment of a military command in East Africa under 
~ir George Erskine, just at the time of Egypt ' s revolution 
and the establishment of the Nationalist regime .319 
The Nevi York rl'imes commented: 
The presumption here is that the eastern half 
of Africa, together with Turkey is going to be 
called on to replace the center of strength 
that was t,;gypt ana the Levant when Britain was 
in control there . 320 
Also worthy of note is the fact that these events 
paralleled the establishment of the Central African Federa-
tion, composed of Northern and ~outhern Hhoaesia and 
Nyasalana ) 21 
Regarding the United States' grant of aid to the East 
African countries , it is of interest to note the operation 
of the Mutual ~ecurity Administration in the early 1950's . 
Basil Davidson gives an account of the establishment 
of Tanganyika Concessions, an international organization 
formed to exploit the mineral wealth of East ana Central 
Africa . 
319The Nevl York Times, i•Iay 30, 1953, page 4 . 
320Ibid . , p . 10 , col . 4. 
32lrbia . , p . 10, col . 6 . 
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Tanganyika Concessions issued 3,831,412 ordinary 
shares in April, 1950 . 'l'he British goverrunent sold 
l,b77,9ol shares to an Anglo- oelgian group . In November, 
1950: 
• • • bOO,OOO of these shares had been resold 
to an American group headed by Ladenburg 'l'halmann 
and Company and Lazard Freres of New York, in 
association with the International Basic ~conomy 
Gorporation ana uavid rtockefeller- -that is, to 
the hockefeller interests .322 
The extent of the involvement of 1'anganyika Conces-
sions in the economy of East and Central Africa may be 
estimated from the following: the company owns a minority 
interest in the Union l'•1iniere du Haut Katanga; it operates 
the uranium mines from which the United States gets 
ninety per cent of its uranium; it owns ninety per cent of 
the Benguela Railway which hauls ore to Lobita Bay in 
Angola; it has a controlling interest in Kentan Gold 
Areas (Kenya) and Uruwira I•1inerals in Tanganyika, and it 
is closely connected with the British South Africa Company, 
and the Anglo-American Corporation .323 
322uavidson, "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms ," 
p . 209 . 
323Ibid . 
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From this resume one readily perceives that the 
organization of the economy of East Africa, especially 
strategic metals, is complex indeed . But , more complexity 
is involved, for in 1952 the Mutual ~ecurity Administration 
lent :Pl, b40, 000 to Uruwira i1J.inerals, whicn contracted to 
repay the loan with lead and copper . 324 
John Gunther commented that, 11By ana large FOA 
and Point Four are much less conspicuous in colonial 
territories than in the independent states , like Libya 
ana Liberia . n325 He went on to say that JUnerican 
technical help had been promised for East Africa . 
'I'he llfmtual ::>ecurity Administration v1as intended to 
aid small businesses rather than agriculture . Accordingly, 
Kenya was denied a request for ~2 . 8 million for agricul-
tural aid , while Uganda and Tanganyika were granted 
assistance to stimulate small industry . 32b 
The limitation of grants to small industry leaves a 
discrepancy to be accounted for when one remembers that the 
IvL. S . A. granted the rather large loan to Uruwira I•Linerals, 
324roia . 
325John Gunther, Inside Africa {New York: harper and 
Brothers, 1953), p . 350 . 
32orhe New YorK Times, July 3, 1953, page 6. 
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which was in the business of mining a strategic metal for 
airplane construction .327 
The importance of ~ast Africa in the estimation of 
the United ~ta~es, and the direction of i~s aid policies, 
may be seen in the fact that in 1953 and 1954, ~l,b80,000 
were granted to 'l'anganyika for the rebuilding of a road 
from Iringa to 1v1orogoro ) 28 'l'his road connects the Great 
North Road with the port city of Dar es Salaam . 'l'he improve-
ment of the road to Dar es ~alaam assurea the Uruwira Min-
era1s of better communications wi~h shipping in the Indian 
Ocean, as well as facilitating the movement of other 
necessities in the event of war . 
In addition, f. 2,390,000 were granted to the i:ast 
African rtailways ana Harbors to facilitate the export of 
sisal and other conunodities, and ~.300,000 was granted to 
each of the three territories for aia to small industries, 
in return for various raw materials • .3 29 
The New York 'l'imes reported in June, 1955, that the 
United ~tates had granted ~4,161,800 to the ~ast African 
.327united I\lations Review, 1:26, l•Lay, l95b • 
.3 2811Atlantic li.eport on the .. orld 'l'oday," Atlantic, 
19.3:19, January, 1954 • 
.3 29Ibid . 
countries on a matching fund basis. In that amount was 
~3,887,300 for development in Kenya .330 '1'anganyika had 
the most value so far as strategic metals ana communi-
cations were concernea, but Kenya received the funds . 
Kenya had a large investment from Britain in the 
settler farming community and small valuable mineral 
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deposits . Also, her communications were alreaay developed, 
in the railway w.tlich reached all the way from the port of 
Mombasa to Kampala in Uganda . 
Uganda received more attention than Kenya, but less 
than 'l'anganyika, because of her production of cotton, coffee, 
and copper . Her gross domestic proauct amountea to ~o6 per 
head of population . 33l 
Coffee exports were restricted by the East African 
countries in tne 1959 International Coffee Agreement, which 
was advocated by the United ~tates . 332 Cotton and coffee 
33Q'l,he New York 'l'imes, June 17, 1955, page b . 
331Adamantioris Pepelasis and others, Economic 
Development (New York: Harper and brothers, 1961), p . 215. 
33 2Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), The United States in 
Worla Affairs, 1222 (~ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1960T, 
pp . 3b7- b8 . 
exports represented an estimated eighty per cent of 
Uganda's total foreign sales . 333 
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\'ihen United e>tates aid to India , in the form of sur-
plus cotton, threatened to eroae the Uganda cotton market in 
the same country, a protest was made by a representative of 
another form of American aid to ~ast Africa. Henry 'l'homas, 
a graduate student at l·1assachusetts Institute of Technology, 
who was working with the Uganda Development Corporation, 
protested to the United btates government . 334 
Through the Uganda Development Corporation, the United 
~tates was involved in promoting the economy of Uganda by 
giving information a bout investment opportunities in that 
country, and as operator of some businesses . 335 
Another 1~1 . I . T . fellow was Project Development 
Officer in the Ivdnistry of Commerce and Industry of 
'Tanganyika . He developed the agreement with an Italian 
firm to build a refinery in that country. Later he advised 
the government when it acquired an interest in tne 'langan-
yika Jv,eerschaum Company, which was about to cease 
operations .33b 
333'1' . K. Hopkins , "Uganda : 'lhe Politics of Compro-
mise,n Current History , 46:174, I• .. arch, 1964 . 
334'l'he Nevv Yorker , 42 :124, l••arch 5, 1966 
335p 1 . •t epe as1s , 2£• £!_. , p . 247 . 
33~'he New Yorker, 42 :116, i•1arch 5 , l9bb . 
Kenya also had its 1~1 . I. T. fellow in the person 
of l~J.ichael Roemer, who helped negotiate a loan from the 
World bank . He was Planning Officer in the treasury in 
Nairobi . 337 
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Another incident involving a M. I. T. fellow occur-
red when l•1ichael Christian, who was the Legal ~ecretary of 
the ~ast African Common Services 0rganization, was intro-
duced to a gold smuggler as an American missionary from 
Tanganyika . He contracted to buy 4>75 , 000 worth of gold 
from the smuggler and his guise of missionary was accepted 
at face value. It did not seem incongruous to the smuggler .338 
The l.Vl . I . 'l' . students represented a genuine contri-
bution to the economies and governments of the new iast 
African states . although they may have seemed to work 
against the interests of the United ~tates, in reality 
they served that interest . At the time the concern of the 
United btates was with the establishment of stable and 
viable governments in the area . 
American contributions to ~ast Africa were not all 
self-serving . Lionel Cliffe wrote in l9b4: 
••• On Independence Day, almost half a 
million people in the barren Central Hegion , 
337rbia ., p . 128 . 
338rbia ., p . 134 . 
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where famine is endemic, were being kept alive 
on free issues of United ~tates surplus corn.339 
Similarly, A. J . I~:..eyers wrote regarding Kenya in 1965 
that imports of American corn amounted to some ~5 million 
vmrth . And) II . . . most U. ~ . aia to Kenya--amounting to 
11.7 million dollars this year--goes into education and 
agriculture training . n340 
United States aid ~o Africa remains small when com-
pared with other areas of the world . David Bell estimated, 
in l•.ay, 1964, that United ::,tates aid in .africa amounted to 
little more than one dollar per capita.341 
Arnold Rivkin summed up American attitudes tovmrd 
Africa in an article in 1965 by saying: 
As the continent receiving the smallest 
segment of our aid (less than 10~), Africa 
aeserves more if we are to give credence to 
our policy of support for African develop-
ment .342 
339Lionel Cliffe, 11'l'anganyika," Current History, 
46:136, l'i1arch , 1964 . 
340A. J . Iv.eyers, 11Five Years of Freeaom," U. 5. News 
ana world Report , 59:56, July 5, 19o5. 
341David Bell, "Foreign Aid Today," Department of 
State Bulletin, 50:$32, l•1ay 25 , 1964 . 
342Arnold hivkin , "Lost Goals in Africa," Foreign 
Affairs, 44:123, October, 1965 . 
l3b 
III . l~UL'l'I-LA'l'ERAL AID 
Africa, the last continent ~o experience nationalism, 
furnished the largest number of states to the United Nations 
organization . 343 
l•1any leaders of the African states have advocated 
the use of the United Nations as a channel through which 
aid would flow from the developed countries to the 
undeveloped ones . 344 
The result was the formation, in 1958, of the ~conomic 
Commission for Africa , which divided Africa into five regions . 
~orne reservations were expressed, in fear that the regions 
might become economic and political entities , making later 
unity of the whole of Africa more difficult . 345 
Meeting in Adois Ababa , ~thiopia in 19bl, the 
Commission adoptea a program of development which had been 
workea out by twenty-four African states . The plan had the 
tacit approval of the United St~tes .34b 
343william G. Carlton , The Revolution in American 
Foreign Policy (~ew York : Handom House , l9b3), p . 445 . 
344:tw1boya, Freedom and After , p . 180 . 
345Ibia . , p . 224 . 
34brfans Kohn ana w~allace bokolsky , African Nationali.§E! 
in the 'twentieth Century (Princeton : D. Van Nostrand Company, 
Incorporated , 19b5), p . 98 . 
Tom Mboya has expressed reticence about the 
effectiveness of the plan with the following corrunent : 
The multi- lateral arrangements through inter-
national agencies coulo help greatly . The only 
snag here is that lifrica is moving on to the 
international scene at a time when most of the 
international agencies have been established , 
and no attempt is being made to reorganize them 
to take account of the emergence of Africa . 
bo that for some tirue to come , they will pre-
sumably continue to function on the basis of 
what their original sponsors wanted them to 
achieve , without considering what is in the 
best interests of the newer nations .347 
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'l'he above situation forced the new states into the 
position of making bi - lateral agreements for aid .348 And, 
they have attempted to safeguard their sovereignty by 
making such agreements with both ~ast and \'lest )49 
Arnold ttivkin has summed up the Western approach to 
the multi - lateral aici question by saying that the effort 
would be basically \/estern and American , although others 
would be invited to join.J50 •l'hese efforts continue to be 
the substance of American policy . liegional development 
34 'l.rv1boya , l''reedom and After, p . 181 . 
348rbia ., p . 180 . 
349rbia . , p . 323 . 
35°l!;mil Lengyel , "Sub- Saharan Jungle of Dilemmas , " 
a review of the book Africa ana the \:est by Arnola .tdvkin, 
~at~roay Review , 45 :22, lv1arch 10-;-T9~ 
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offers at~ractive possibilities in the matters of control 
of funds and future political unification of the continent . 
IV. lNV .t'..S1'1',.Ji:N'1' AND 'l'h~DE 
An estimate of the market needed to maintain full 
employment in the Uni tea :::>tates, after ~Jorld War II, placed 
exports near the ~10 billion mark .35l 
By January, 1952, the value of foreign trade of the 
United States had reached the new high of ~25 billion . 
Such trade was necessitated by the raw material needs of 
the defense program and the Korean har . 352 
'l'he vital nature of African minerals caused a massive 
infusion of American capital for the purpose of developing 
and protecting them. 
Basil Davidson called on the United States to use 
investments for the needs of the African population, as 
well as exploitation for profit . 353 
A common fear of investors \'vas that their capital 
woula be consumed by the fires of nationalism which were 
35lb . E. Harris, "Employment and ~xport Trade," New 
Republic, 112:111-14, January 22, 1945 . 
3 52'l'he l'IJ ew York 'l'imes, January 2, 1952, page 49 . 
353basil Davidson, 11Africa: .c;mergent Colossus," 
Nation, 173:167- 89, beptember 8, 1951 . 
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evident by the early 1950's . 'l'he J . P . r~1organ Company 
was concerned about investment opportunities in Kenya, 
ana the possible results of the 1~1au l•1au rebellion then 
in progress in that country . 'l'he company was assured that 
Britain would not leave Kenya .354 
At the end of 1952, the airect investment of the 
Unitea t>tates in Africa was placed at ~458 million . That 
figure compared with ~312 million at the end of 1950 . Some 
52 per cent was investea in petroleum, mainly marketing 
ana distribution, 20 per cent was investea in mining, and 
15 per cent was given to manufacturing . 355 
John Gunther estimated that the extent of American 
interest in ~ast Africa was represented in the fact that: 
• • • an american oil company haa aevelop-
ment licenses for a petroleum survey in 
nortnern Kenya, ••• and an American auto-
mobile assembly plant is to be built at 
1v10mbasa . 3 5b 
He also mentioned that the Coca Cola Company was engaged 
in business in Kenya . 
3 54
'lhe 1~ew York 'l'imes, lJecemoer 9, 1952, page 3 . 
355Hernard Blankenheimer, nl-rivate .c.nterprise in 
Africa," Africa 'l'oday, G. Grove Haines , editor (Baltimore: 
'l'he Johns Hopkins fress, 1955), p . 4b0 . 
356Gunther, QE. cit . , p . 350 . 
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American investment in the continent increased 
42 per cent between 1953 and 1957, amounting to ~573 million 
in 1957.357 One estimate placed the increase of American 
investment in Africa since 1945 at 2,500 per cent.35B 
By 1960, the amount of trade with Africa had reached 
a total of about ~1 .2 billion annually, and the investment 
was placed at more than ~600 million .359 
\Vhen the African states became independent, their 
leaders insisted that foreign investment and aid be used 
to serve the needs of their countries, as they defined 
those needs.360 
Private investment in East Africa, by 1960, amounted 
to some $46 million . One million dollars were invested in 
mining, ~42 millions were invested in petroleum, and 
~4 millions were invested in trade.361 
357John 5cott, "Last Chance in Africa,n Atlantic, 
203:93, April, 1959. 
358James h . Robinson , Africa at the Crossroads 
(Philadelphia: The Vlestminster Press, 1962), p . 12. 
359Paul S . Zinner (ed.), Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, ~ (New York : Harper ana Brothers, 
1960), p. 414. 
360Bretton, 2£· cit., p . 456. 
36l~armarck, ££· cit., p . 172. 
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Trade with Bast .Africa in l9bl amounted to ~52 
million in imports ana ~19 million in exports . 362 The 
difference between the two was smoothed out by the infusion 
of public funas in the forms of grants and loans . 
Total trade figures for Afr ica amounted to 3 . 2 per 
cent of United ~tates exports and 3 .4 per cent of United 
~tates imports . 363 Such figures do not seem large , but 
they are enough to induce a significant change in the 
overall demand on the production of the inaustrial complex 
of the United States .364 
'l'he policy of the Unitea ~tates was to encourage the 
export of capital to other areas of the world, and it 
underwrote the investments going to high risk places . 3b5 
Tied to the policy of guaranteeing investments by 
the private sector was the requirement of protective 
guarantees by the countries to which the investments were 
going . buch assurances were available in Kenya and 
Tanganyika by July, 1964 . 
362lbid . , pp . 170- 71 . 
3b3Bretton, QQ . cit ., p . 456 . 
364Bert G. Hickman , Growth and ~tability of the Post -
!@!: .8conomy (washington : 'l'he Brookings Institution, 1960), 
p . l9b . 
365vatter, 2£· cit . , p . 268 . 
For each of these countries guarantees were 
available with respect to convertibility , 
expropriation , and war risk, incluaing guaran-
tees against loss due to revolution ana insur-
rection; also extended risk .366 
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The ..t:ast African countries are desirous of foreign 
capital . President Nyerere stated in l9bb, n~·le want 
capital investment here so that the amount of wealth which 
can be produced in 1anzania is increased, ana our people 
will therefore become better off in the future . u3b7 
however , l'vi.r . Nyerere goes on to say that his government 
wants investment for a purpose, and it will be welcome 
only if it fulfills that purpose .368 
Tanzania ' s intention is that investments will 
benefit the people as a whole, ana not just the investor .369 
'l'he article in which I•1r . l\iyerere maae the above assertions 
was written to defend his policy and its effect upon the 
development of his coun~ry . 
lt seems reasonable to assume that the infusion of 
American capital into Africa will continue , especially in 
36q~iinerals Yearbook, Unitea btates Department of the 
lnterior, IV (Washington : Government Printing Office , l9b4J, 
p . 947 . 
367 Julius l~yerere, "'lhe Costs of Non- Alignment , " 
Africa Heport, Vol . II , 7:bb, Gctober, 19Db . 
3681 . 0 .. 1.0 . 3o9r . d 7 __Q1_ ., p . b • 
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the areas of strategic metals and petroleum . The future 
development of the continent holds much promise for the 
United 0tates as a market for inaustrial goods, as well as 
a profitable investment of funds in the exploitation of 
natural resources . 
CHAPTER VI 
O'l'HBR UNI'l'~D S'l'A'l'ES INVOLVElVIENTS IN EAST AFRICA 
I . RAC~ AND RACE RELATIONS 
An affinity exists between the moaern African and 
his American Negro brother . Such a feeling should not seem 
strange, for the Pan- African movement began in the United 
~tates, and the Africans feel a certain amount of gratituae 
because of that fact . 'I' om l-'1boya has said : 
It should be understood that we feel a special 
kinship with American Negroes , and that we see 
our struggles as closely related . Segregation 
robs the United States of the moral standing 
she needs if she is to give effective leadership 
to the free world . 370 
Efforts to establish the principle of equality of 
the races in the United States were viewed with sympathy 
and unaerstanding . Those who were victims of discrimina-
tion expressed commendation for the government, as well 
as an impatience with those who would obstruct its 
efforts )71 
37°'l'om J. 1~1boya, "Key ~uestions for Awakening Africa, 11 
'l'he New York Times I~1agazine , June 2$, 1959, p . 39 . 
3 71H.ichard P . ~tebbins ( ed . ), 'l'he United 3tates in 
world Affairs , 12§2. (New York : Harper and How, 1966), p-.-26 . 
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The American Negro does not identify with the 
African to the extent that the African identifies with the 
Negro . 372 Probably because he has been cut off from his 
homeland for so long and that he has been fully oriented 
to Western life, the Negro has thought of himself as an 
American first of all . 
~ast African leaders juage the United ~tates by its 
accomplishments in regard to the Negroes among its citizens. 
They believe that the freedom struggle in which they have 
become engaged is tne struggle of all men of color.373 
Perhaps the performance of the Unitea ~tates in 
regard to Africans upon the continent has affected relation-
ships more than the domestic problem, for the Americans 
have an equivocal record so far as Africans in bouth Africa, 
Rhodesia, Angola, l110zambique, and ;:,outhwest Africa are 
concerned .374 The temporizing attitude of the United 
0tates is represented by a statement made by Undersecretary 
0atterthwaite: 
372Tom J. Mboya, Freedom and After (London: Andre 
Deutsch, Limited, l9b3), p . 230 . 
373rbid ., p . 242 . 
374Richard .P . ~tebbins (ed . ), The United ~tates in 
~orld Affairs, 1.2.22. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 
p. 192 . 
"Our official policy is clear and unmistakably 
opposed to racial discrimination . Nevertheless, 
in view of our own domestic problems in the field 
of racial relations, the United States should in 
good conscience avoid attempting to suggest to 
any African territory specific solutions to 
these problems . "375 
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African students in the United ~tates have complained 
that Negroes often exhibit an unfriendly and superior atti-
tude toward them .376 
East Africa has its own racial problems . 'l'he 
settlers in Kenya , the Indians in all the territories, 
the Arabs along the coast and on the island of Zanzibar , 
all contribute to a racial problem which rivals any other 
difficulty .377 An influx of Indians into East Africa in 
1952 raised some serious problems for all governments in 
the area .3 7 8 
Tribalism also represents a formidable problem for 
the East African states . Indeed, some observers have 
375Joseph C. Satterthwaite , quoted in Documents on 
American Foreign Relations , 1222, Paul E . Zinner , editor-
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1960), p . 412 . 
376"Disappointed Africans," Newsweek, 58:30 , 
December 18, 1961 . 
3 77Frank :rv~oraes , "The Importance of Being Black ; an 
Asian Looks at Africa," Foreign Affairs, 43 : 99, October , 19c4. 
378c. L . ~ulzberger , a dispatch from Dar es ~alaam , 
Tanzania for The Nev1 York Times , December 31 , 1952, page 4. 
suggested that the new countries will founder on the 
difficult problem of tribalism .379 
147 
Negroes in the United ~tates have been able to assert 
themselves to an extent approached by no other Western state . 
Africans are aware of this fact and their estimation of 
United btates ' racial policy is that it is proceeding in 
the desired direction . When the Kenya Africans made a 
pilgrimage to London in l9b0 to write a constitution , 
their counsel was Thurgood l\larshall )SO The very recent 
elevation of I~.~.arshall to the ~upreme Court of the United 
0tates probably will favorably affect relations with ~ast 
Africa . 
II . A~SI~TANCI!: TO LABOR 
East African nationalism has been closely connected 
with the labor movement . Tom I'v1boya , who is deeply involved 
in the labor organizations of Kenya, as well as the politics 
of the country, says that the real beginning of unionism in 
Kenya was during the l>1au Iv.~.au emergency .3Sl 
379A . J . Toynbee, "Africa : .birth of a Continent," 
0aturday Review, 47:27, December 5, 1964; ~lspeth Huxley, 
n Africa's First Loyalty, n The New York Times l•1agazine, 
September 18, 1960, p . 14. 
380vona1d \'Ieidner, A history of Africa !:Iouth of the 
Sahara (New York : Vintage Books, 19o4T, p . 419 . 
3811~1boya, Freedom ana After, p . 195 . 
148 
In 1953 there were seven unions in Kenya, and by 
1963 there were twenty-eight . These unions have combined 
to form the Kenya Federation of Labor . 382 The unions of 
Kenya were aided by the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, in the persons of David Newman and 
Jim Bury . 383 These men helped Africans to organize and 
to specify their aims as labor organizations . 
The American Federation of Labor also aided the 
Africans of Kenya by giving them access to their publica-
tions, as well as other aid . 384 
From Kenya, the development began in Tanganyika, 
when Mboya visited Dar es Salaam in 1955 . In the capital 
of 1anganyika, he talked with Rashidi Kawawa, who was 
Secretary of the Civil ~ervants Association.385 At the 
suggestion of ~boya, the leaders of the various union 
organizations agreed to form the Tanganyika Federation of 
Labor, and the movement in that territory became national 
in scope.386 
382Ibid . , p. 196 . 
384Ibid . 
386Ibid . 
3B3Ibid., p . 36 . 
385Ibid., p . 197. 
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lVIboya also visited Uganaa in 1955 for the same pur-
pose as his trip to Tanganyika . He found that the laborers 
in that country were much harder to organize than in Kenya 
or Tanganyika , and their progress was noticeably slower . 
The Uganda laborers only began to take an interest when the 
organization showed some tangible results . 387 
John 0cott gave an American appraisal of the labor 
movement ' s importance in Africa by asserting in 1959 that 
" .•• the labor unions constitute one of the most 
important barriers to Gomn1unist infiltration into the 
continent •113 88 
The response of American labor officials was 
appropriate, attested by the following analysis by the 
Council on Foreign Relations in 1959 : 
Requests for assistance have been made directly 
to American labor leaders who have visited Africa 
and by African leaders who have visited here . In 
response, aid is being given airectly and through 
the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions and other free labor organizations with 
which American unions are affiliated .389 
388John ~cott , "Last Chance in Africa,n Atlantic, 
203:93, April , 1959 . 
389Paul ~ . Zinner (ed . ), Documents 2n American 
Foreign Relations, 1222 (New York : Harper and Brothers , 
l9t>O), p . 418 . 
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~ast African unions have followed the forms of 
American unionism . Illlboya remarked. that 11 . . • we also 
became convinced we would have to move to the American 
and Canao.ian system of a ' check- off ' payment of dues, 
u390 
. . . . The system was placed upon the statute books 
of Tanganyika , and was accepted. by many employers in Kenya 
and Uganda on a voluntary basis . 391 
While more extensive resources would. no doubt reveal 
a deeper involvement of American Labor with the East 
Africans, the above citations attest to the fact that this 
country was significantly engaged in efforts to organize 
the workers of ~ast Africa into effective unions . 
III . EDUCATION 
The United 0tates has played an important role in 
the education of Africans since world har I . A few students 
made their way to this country ana studied in various fields. 
They were generally poor, lonely, and discriminated against, 
and they all crune to the conviction that Africa was not 
destined to be the dependency of Europe, but that they, too, 
had distinctive contributions to make to the worla . 
39'1~1boya , Freedom ana After, p . 190 . 
39lrbid ., p . 191 . 
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Prior to 111orld v~ar II, few Africans ever left their 
homeland . But, some aid leave , travelled broadly, and 
usually found their way to America . 'l'he United 0tates 
provided much of the stimulus for the movement toward 
nationalism . 392 
Perhaps the small number of Africans studying in the 
United 0tates helps explain the success of their venture . 
~ecause , had the number been very large , the colonial 
authorities probably would have tried to thwart their 
efforts , as they did in the case of Gatheru . 
The number of Africans in American schools always 
remained small . A report in July, 1952, gave the total 
number of foreign students in the Unitea States as 30,462 . 
Significantly, there was no estimate of the number of 
African students . 393 
Although small groups were aiding Africans in 
education in the United ~tates , perhaps the first signifi-
cant organization was the African- American Institute, 
founded in 1953, which began to expedite the movement of 
392Hans Kohn and #allace ~okolsky , African National -
ism in the 'l'wentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, 1965), p . 22 . 
393J . \"/. Gardner, nForeign Students in America," 
Foreign Affairs , 30 : 637- 50, July, 1952 . 
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Africans to the United ~tates . The organization set up 
an office in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika to process applica-
tions for scholarships ana other matters related to the 
students ' preparations for college . 394 
Tom Iv~boya came to the United States in 1956 and 
found that scholarships had been offered to £ast African 
students, but they were unable to pay for their transpor-
tation . '!'he problem was presented to the American Committee 
on Africa ana means were found to transport a number of 
students to the United States .395 
In 1959 , the African- American Students Foundation 
was begun with the purpose of raising money to charter air-
craft to transport East African students to the United 
~tates )96 'l'hat year saw eighty- one students transported 
by the airlift, one of whom later became the wife of 
f•.r . M.boya . 3 97 
The founding of the African- American ~tudents Founda-
tion, and its subsequent activities , provided impetus for 
394l•1boya, Freedom and After, p . 145 . 
395rbid . , p . 59 . 
397lb' . ~a. 
396rbid. , p . 138 . 
further action by official groups, as l•1boya notes in his 
account of the events . 
The African- American btudents Foundation spur-
red on the Ivy League colleges to set up ASPAU, 
and it also stirred the Institute of Interna-
tional Education, which is a private agency 
handling educational exchange for the U. ~ . 
Government on a contract basis, to expand its 
then small programme . 398 
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The small size of the budget for African education 
may be seen in the comment of Time in 1960 when it said, 
nThe State Department spends less on African education 
(~2,000,000 this year) than it does in any other area . u399 
The year l9b0 provided an interesting incident 
involving African students . ,,ben the students could not 
meet the expense of travel to the United btates, they asked 
the Bisenhower Administration to finance the project . 
'l'he government refused to grant their request, but John F . 
Kennedy arranged for the necessary funds through the 
K d F ' . 400 enne y ounaat~on . 
The presidential campaign was in progress and the 
response of Kennedy provided abundant publicity for him . 
398rbia . , p . 145 . 
399rime, 76 :bl, ~eptember 5, 1960 . 
4{)0 Arthur Jv1 . ~chlesinger, Jr . , A Thousand Days 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p . 554 . 
The government later offered the money needed, but the 
Kennedy Foundation funds had already been accepted . 40l 
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1he Department of ~tate made ~100,000 available in 1961 for 
the purpose of transporting ~ast African students to the 
United States .4°2 
The students who came to American schools were at 
the heart of East African life, since they were in posi-
tions to contribute to the progress of the people . They were 
clerks, teachers, secretaries, draughtsmen, laboratory assist-
ants, surveyors, postal clerks, salesmen and health inspec-
tors .403 The contribution of American educational enter-
prises will never be ascertained with finality , but it must 
be considered important. 
The public school system made an indelible impression 
on many of the students . A representative comment is the 
following, taken from 1'he New York Times Iv1agazine: none of 
the really great things about America that I have been dis-
covering since my arrival is your public school system . n404 
40lrJiboya, Freedom and After, p. 146 . 
4°2rbid ., p. 139 . 403rbia., p . 148 . 
404Amos Kiriro, "An African ~tudent Studies Us,n 
The New York Times Magazine, December 10, 1961, pp . 114-15 . 
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'!'he number of students continued to increase as the 
countries of East Africa progressed toward , and acquired , 
independence .405 
Not only have Americans contributed to education on 
the advanced levels , but they have been deeply committed to 
education within the .t:ast African countries . An example is 
the Jeanes School at Kiambu , Kenya . '!'his school was named 
for Anna '1' . Jeanes of Phil adel phia, who contributed to its 
support . Primarily , the school is for adult education , 
which is an impressive need of East Africa . 4°6 Later , the 
Agency for International .uevelopment contributed money for 
the conversion of the Jeanes ~cnool into the Kenya Insti-
tute of Administration .407 
Literacy among adults has been of much concern to 
the governments of .l!;ast Africa . Consequently , many groups 
have designed programs to attack the problem of adult 
education . 408 
405Joseph ~ . Nye, Jr ., Pan- Africanism ~ ~ast African 
Integration (Cambridge , I'-'1assachusetts : Harvard University 
Press , l9o5J , p . 81; Africa Report , December , 1966, p . 22 . 
406a . l-i . 'l' • .Kimble , "Compelling Need, Educa~ion for 
Africans , " '!.'he New York 'lirr.es l·!agazine , r~.arch 5 , l9bl , p . 31 . 
407Iv1boya , Freedom_ and hfter , p . 153 . 
408Ibid ., p . 152; Unpublished minutes of 'l'he Baptist 
Mission of ~ast Africa , rlUgust 23, 1956 , on file witn The 
~,oreign l•!ission board of 'l'he ~outhern baptist Convention, 
hichmond , Virginia . 
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vfuen independence came to the East African countries, 
there was a critical shortage of secondary school teachers . 
A response to this need was made by the United .States \vhen 
the Agency for International Development asked Columbia 
University to send 157 teachers to the area . They received 
training at Columbia , with additional orientation at 
I~1akerere College in Uganda . They served in all the East 
African countries .409 In three years the program sent 
more than 370 secondary teachers to iast Africa to relieve 
one of the most pressing needs faced by the countries .410 
An example of multi- lateral aid to education in all 
of Africa is the UNE~CO ~pecial Fund, which was inaugurated 
in 19b4 . The fund was given a total of ~$5 million which 
was to be spent in forty- two countries, twenty- six of 
which were in Africa .4l l The United btates will contribute 
heavily to the program, as it does to all Unitea Nations 
projects . 
409Gertrude bamuels , "In Answer to Africa ' s l'~eed for 
Teachers , " The li.Jew York Times l•'iagazine, I~~arch 1$ , 19D2, 
pp . 89- 90 . 
410nTeachers for East Africa,n :Jchool illJ.d bociety, 
Vol . 91, 1~1arch 23, l9b3, p . 137 . 
411James A. Joyce , "Priorities in African r;ducation , " 
baturaay_ l:tevie\'r , 46 : 55, April 15 , 1964 . 
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IV . THE P~AC~ CORP~ 
~erhaps nothing excited the idealism of young 
Americans more than the Peace Corps . Createa by President 
Kennedy, the Corps was designed to mobilize the idealism 
of America ' s youth , and , in the process, to make a con-
tribution to the welfare of developing nations .412 
The energetic young Americans were not received 'With-
out questionings however , and it was necessary for the 
director to allay the fears of the fledgling governments 
aoout tne purpose of tne organization . 413 
A report of the work of the Peace Corps in Bast 
Africa in 1966 gave the total number of volunteers as 649 . 
Of that total, 457 were engaged in teaching, either in 
elementary or secondary education . 414 
An indication of the contribution being made by the 
teachers in the Peace Corps is seen in the following comment: 
The Peace Corps had become a vital force in 
African education, particularly secondary 
education . It had encouraged an expansion of 
African school systems , challenged the habit of 
rote learning , ana, to a lesser extent, dampened 
412~chlesinger, QE• cit . , p . bG6 . 
413Ibid ., p . 607 . 
4140tanley I~1eisler, "Peace C.orps Teaching in Africa, u 
Africa Heport, December, 196b, p . 18 . 
elitism in the schools . It is trying to help 
African leaders prevent tteir schools from becom-
ing factories for the production of facts with-
out thought-- of nskeletons without organs . "415 
Without the teachers provided by the Peace Corps, 
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much of the advancement made by the school systems in East 
Africa would not exist . 416 'l'he Corps has been a primary 
source of teachers for '1 anzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) • 4l7 
While the primary task of the Peace Corps in East 
Africa has been to aia in education, there have been people 
\rith other skills working there too . They have been 
engaged in most of the phases of public life in the area . 
V. MIS~ION UNDERTAKINGS 
American missionary efforts in East Africa began in 
the nineteenth century and have contriouted much to the area 
in many fields . 
Groups that have work in East Africa include the 
African Inland I1ission , American F'riends , the Church of God, 
~eventh Day Adventists, ~outhern Baptists , Assemblies of God, 
415Ibid . , p . lb . 
417rb. -
__.!£ . 
4lbib . . 
-1:£· 
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Salvation Army, t;astern Mennonite Board of 1-.issions , 
Christian I'<lissions in l•1any Lands, Gospel }'urthering Fellow-
ship and the Churches of Christ .41S 
'l'he work of these organizations is spreaa. over the 
whole of the three countries of Kenya, Uganaa, and 
1anganyika, Zanzibar receiving scant attention .419 
Their work is extensive, taking in most of the fields 
of humanitarianism as well as religious activities . 
A typical example is given in the excerpt below: 
American Frienas have been in Kenya since 1902 . 
It is the largest of their five mission fields, 
and Kaimosi near Lake Victoria is their largest 
station . Here 39 missionaries are carrying on an 
ambitious program of medical, ea.ucational, indus-
trial, agricultural, ana evangelistic work . 
Particular projects incluae the bible Institute, 
Girl's Boarriinb ~chool, Boy 's Boarding School, 
Junior ~f.issionary bchool, Inaustrial Department, 
Agricultural Department, Nen's 'reacher Training 
Center, Women 1 s 1'eacher '!'raining Center, Press, 
~Jork Camp and Hospital . Besides all this there 
is an extensive school program on the primary 
and intermediate levels , which provides educa-
tion for almost 40,000 chilriren . Bible teach-
ing is given in all schools. '!'he work at 
Kamusinga, opened in 1957, centers around a 
seconaary school .420 
418hobert Hall Glover, The Pro Tress of ~:orld \Jide 
I•.issions , revised by J. herbert KaneNew York : Harper-
ana rtow, l9b0), pp. 32b- 35. 
419I .. iartha L . I•loennich, 1iorld Missj..Q!!.§_ (Grana Rapias , 
Michigan : The Zondervan Press, 1950), pp. 145- 4b . 
420Glover, ££• cit . , p . 326 . 
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~~ile other mission groups do not conform precisely 
to the foregoing example , it indicates the scope of work 
of mission groups in all the East African countries . Some 
have concentrated their efforts on a few types of work, 
but all have engaged in a broad ministry . Southern Baptists 
entered East Africa in 1956, establishing a specialized 
hospital at lV!beya, 'l'anganyika, and a goodwill center , 
with adult literacy work , at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika . 421 
That mission endeavors are extensive , and their 
accomplishments impressive are undeniable . tim•Tever, many 
question the motivations for a voluntary engagement in 
sucn work . 
H. C. Goerner , becretary for Africa for the Foreign 
1v.~.ission Board of 'l'he ::louthern Baptist Convention has stated 
the motivation in terms of the eternal purpose of God to 
bring salvation to all of mankind . The incentive for the 
individual is to help in carrying out that purpose . 422 
Harold Lindsell includes n.~.ore in the following 
analysis of the motivation for mission work: 
\i.hen any Christian notes the spiritual , 
physical, and moral morass of the pagan world, 
421rb · · 335 
---±£., p . • 
422H. C. Goerner, Thus lt Is dritten (Nashville, 
'l'ennessee: 'l'he Convention Press,- 1944), p . 34 . 
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all of which he knows to be the consequences 
of sin and when he realizes that he himself 
has been delivered from this bondage and 
corruption without works and by grace , con-
straint, of necessity, is laid upon him to 
bring to otners the same opportunity for 
deliverance which has been tlis .423 
Such an estimate includes more than an interest in 
the future salvation; it becomes cultural and implies that 
the technical and economic aspects of the American , or 
Western, society is the result of the Christian Gospel . 
Robert Hall Glover is more explicit when he enumer-
ates the motivations for mission enterprises . He first 
talks about the physical condition of the mission fields 
ana associates them with the absence of Christianity . 
Next he gives the moral circumstance of the pagan, speak-
ing of the various cultural practices such as caste , 
polygamy, and others . 'l'his , too, is a central motivation 
of mission work. His last element is the spiritual con-
dition of the heathen .424 
~oruetimes it is intimated that the concern with the 
physical ana cultural elements is prompted by a desire to 
423Harold Lindsell , lv.issionary Principles and Practice 
( ~Jestwooa, 1~ew Jersey : Fleming H. ltevell Company, 1965), 
p . 4b . 
424Glover, ££· cit . , p. 4 . 
find ways of ministering to the spiritual neeas of the 
people.425 Such an analysis would explain many of the 
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enterprises into which missionaries go , such as hospitals 
ana schools . But , it does not explain the extent, univer-
sality and permanence of' such commitments . 
Lindsell indicates that the mission concern is also 
humanitarian and cultural . 
Christianity can and does do something about 
physical conditions . One of its most important 
by- products is that humanitarian concern which 
corrects these tragic anomalies through educa-
tion , example , and CnrLstian zeal . 42b 
henry P . Van Dusen, writing in l9b4 , indicated a 
strong concern over the fact tnat the missions of Africa 
have remained fragmented in the traditional Protestant 
divisions . It is his thought that such division has left 
African missions unable to cope with the problems of the 
emerging denominations in these countries .427 
Another writer ' s opinion is that in order to minister 
to Africa , the Church must disengage itself from the various 
425Johnni Johnson , \'/hat Do I~!issionaries Do? 
(Nashville , 1ennessee : uroadman ~ress , 19b4) , p . 11 . 
42~indsell, 2£· cit ., pp . 47- 4$ . 
427Henry P . \1 an Deusen, 11 '1'hird '1'roughts on Africa , " 
Christian Century, 81 : 855 , July 1 , ~9c4 . 
forms of secular enterprises and turn to direct evangelism, 
somehow finding unity in the process .42S 
l•wst obse rvers will agree that the present attitude 
of African church leaders is ecumenical and they advocate 
more involvement in the political life of the countries . 
The All- Africa Conference of Churches , held in Kampala , 
Uganda in l9b3, gave a picture of Africans who want a 
Pan- African church movement similar to that of the political 
sphere . It also indicated that the old system of missionary 
supervision was doomed . 429 
A certain ambivalence is practiced by many of the 
American denominations working in East Africa . Southern 
Baptists are an example . rl'he mission organization is a 
member of all of the Ctristian Gouncils of the countries 
involved . 'l'he minutes of the second meeting of the Baptist 
li'iission of East Africa contain the following motion: 
~otion passed that we seek to affiliate 
ourselves with the Christian Councils of 
Tanganyika and Kenya and that we cooperate 
42Scecil 1~orthcott, "Christian Democracy in Africa, 11 
Christian Century , 68 :1435, December 12, 1951 . 
4291:.. . G. Parker, "All Africa Christianity," Cnristian 
Century, 80:670- 72, hay 22 , l9b3 . 
with them so long as it does not involve com-
promising our Baptist principles .430 
lb4 
Membership in, ana cooperation witn, the Christian Councils 
has continued to the present time . 
The Councils fill an evident need in coordinating the 
cooperative activities of the various missions, such as that 
of the Kenyans in 1954, when they asked for help in rehabili-
tating the many thousands of former I~lau r·1au followers . 43l 
~uch a task would have been impossible for any of the missions 
alone, as indeed it was beyond the means of the Christian 
Gouncil of Kenya, for it had to ask for emergency help from 
sympathetic Christians in other countries . 
'l'he Christian Council of 'l'anganyika has had a refugee 
project since the influx of Africans fleeing from Rwanda , 
as well as other cooperative efforts .432 
'l'he practical value of the Christian Councils is not 
only in the area of expediting cooperative ventures, but 
also in the fact that the governments prefer to deal with 
430unpublished minutes of The Baptist l'lission of East 
Af1ica, December 0, l~5o, on file with 'l'he Foreign ~ission 
Board of The ::>outnern baotist Lonvention, h.ichmond, Virginia . 
431J·ames H. Robinson, Africa at the Crossroads 
(Philaaelphia: The Westminster Press, l9b2), p . b9 . 
43 2..t.award Hawley, " 'l'anganyika-Zanzibar, u Christian 
Century, 81 :1182, September 23, 1904 . 
165 
only one organization rather than many . The future indi-
cates even closer organization of the religious groups in 
~ast Africa; the Africans are demanding it . 433 
Sir Philip Mitchell, former Governor of Kenya, has 
remarked, when asked about the causes of the twentieth 
century revolution in Africa: 
Well, I believe that, fundamentally, it was 
the Bible, the Bible and the brave, determined, 
merciful men and ,.,10men who carriea it and i t.s 
message of hope--hope of the end of the slave-
trade, of prevention of epidemics and relief of 
famine, of protection from the savage whims of 
tyrants or the obscene orgies of sorcerers--
to a people who were living in a brutish 
lethargy induced by continuous danger, horrors, 
and sufferings .434 
bir Philip was voicing the conviction of the colo-
nialists, who thought that their task was to bring v'iest-
ern civilization to the continent . He equated the work 
of missions with the civilizing work of the British 
government . 
That the same attitude was held by some mission-
aries is apparent from the comments of various critics of 
mission policy . J. H. H.obinson \vrote in 1953, 11 Unfortu-
nately, the communists, the nationalists, ana the 
433A . J . Parel, "Christianity and Colonialism," 
Commonweal, 65:482, February $, 1957. 
434:::,ir .Philip r•1itchell, t!Africa and the 1'/est in 
historical Perspective, 11 Africa Touay, C. Grove Haines, 
eaitor (baltimore: The johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 15. 
lb6 
secularists often equate the missionary movement with the 
colonial exploitation, sometimes with justification . n435 
Another writer states that, n ••• it is not the 
old-line mission denominations from Europe and America 
which championed the cause of revolution in Africa . n436 
The writer further remarked that the political leaders of 
Africa had found the churches to be reactionary and opposed 
to the changes taking place . This seemed strange to them, 
because they respected the role played by the missions in 
the early progress of the Africans. 
The failure of the missions to comprehend the arift 
of the new spirit causea wholesale defections among some of 
the tribes of Africa . The Kikuyu particularly deserted the 
churches during the 1~1au Mau uprising . but , it must be 
emphasized that the defection was incipient long before the 
publicized rebellion.437 
Elijah r~.asinde was one of the many native religious 
leaders of Africa to form entirely indigenous churches . 
435James H. Robinson, "Africa and Asia 's Challenge to 
l•lissions ," Christian Century, 70:133, February 4, 1953 . 
43 6G. i~ .. cCleod bryan, "Revolution and Religion in 
Africa ," Christian Century, 78:12, January 4, l9t>l. 
437nRevolt Against Christianity,n 'l' ime, 75:7b, 
June 13, 1960 . 
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He formed a movement based on eclectic aoctrines which 
were vaguely Christian. He also demanded that the ~uropean 
be expelled from Kenya . 43S Such separatist movements have 
arisen in many areas of East Africa as well as other 
countries on the continent.439 
The natural proclivity of mission groups to give aid 
and comfort to colonialism was recognized ana efforts have 
been made to change the attitudes of the missionaries toward 
their African proteges, taking them into full partnership 
with the missionaries in the posts of management and policy-
making . In t his way it is hoped that the separatist 
movements will be stifled and the ministry of the churches 
to Africa may be preserved .440 
It is hoped also th~t mission bodies will be able to 
exert a stabilizing influence on the African states as they 
consolidate their rule and evolve indigenous institutions 
throughout their national life . 44l 
438c. . L . ~ulzberger, ur'au kau and Christianity , 11 The 
New York tim~, January lo, 1953, page 3 . 
439Robinson , £2· cit ., 1 . 72. 
44°:t.bia., p . oo . 
441Leo Silberman , "Challenge to lJ•issions in Africa," 
Chri§ti_gn_ Century , 7b:386, Aprj_l l, 1959 . 
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'l'he failure of American missionaries to distinguish 
between their culture ana the essential Christian Gospel 
has been the greatest single mistake in Africa . The comment 
of an African in the American Journal of bociology makes 
the point clearly . 
'I'he establishment of Christian missions in 
Africa has been an act of spiritual aggression; 
they operated on the principle that everything 
African and indigenous is contrary , while every-
thing ~uropean ana foreign is acceptable to the 
will of God . The glaring contradiction between 
religious theory and the economic and political 
practices of Christians has made Africans ais-
trust the Christian Church , and it is losing 
ground through its own fault . 442 
The seriousness of the effect on sociological matters 
is made also in the same publication , when an author 
commented : 
Missionaries represent a subculture within 
\Iestern culture . 'l'hey stress theology ana the 
moral taboos more than ao their fellow- countrymen . 
~ccording to the prejudices of their sects , 
l' 'issions combat nakedness , manners , and the mores 
concerning marriage , health , property , and what 
they accomplish is characteristically a compromise 
between Western and indigenous ways . In some cases 
easily assimilable , the new traits may weaken the 
family and the prestige of the chief , destroy 
social classes and create new ones , and usurp the 
native arts .443 
442Ako A.aJe~, "Imperialism ana Spiritual Freedom: An 
african View,n runerican Journal of bociology, 50:189- 98, 
November , 1944 . 
443G . Gordon Brown, "I•.issions anci Cultural Diffusion, n 
American ~ournal of bociology, 50:215-19, November, 1944 . 
L . K. Painter, comn.enting on the a.isruption of 
customs in Kenya by the missionaries, says: 
Too frequently the first action of these 
well- meaning newcomers is figuratively to 
sweep clean the African hut of all primitive 
practices regardless of their worth to 
people living under long established 
cultures . 444 
A typical call for changing cultures is seen in a 
book writ ten by l·~artha L . I-~oennich . She speaks of the 
elements of the culture of Africa \vithout asking v-1hether 
those practices have value to the hfricans, or whether 
they really ao contradict the Christian Gospel .445 
A typical excerpt is given below: 
\Jnen young boys ana girls are initiated into 
adolescence, the vile rites performed (in many 
tribes) are physically harmful ana. morally 
degrading and beyona. description, when the 
cnilaren are taken to fetish groves and made 
to sin . Is there not an urgent call for the 
Gospel to set men free from tnis terrible life? 
how beautiful are the feet of those mission-
aries who have gone in the past, who are there 
now and who are on their way out there . 446 
An apt rejoinder is that of L . K. Painter, writing in 
Christian Century, when he commented regarding the 
444L . K. Painter, n'l'o ::>it ~mere Kenyans bit," 
Christian Century, 76:1337, November 18, 1959. 
445lvloennich, 2£· cit . , p . 139. 
446rb·d 
____.!_ • ' p • 142 . 
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missionaries of Kenya and the Kikuyu, 11Actually, they have 
little direct contact with local village life.n447 
In the same article, Painter accused many mission-
aries of spending several years in Kenya without learning 
the native language, either the local vernacular or the 
trade language, Kiswahili~48 He chargea tnat, 11 ••• they 
have little real knowledge of the people whom they seek to 
convert and are not seriously concerned about their social, 
economic ana political problems . 449 
Harold Lindsell stated: 
Iviissionaries are bound by the cultures in which 
they have oeen raised, ana all other cultures are 
foreign to them . 'l'he temptation for mortal men 
is to regard their particular culture as sacro-
sanct and to think of all other cultures as "queer . 11 
l·10re than t hat, many people think of t heir culture 
as being "rightn and suppose that those vlho do 
things some other way are 11wrong . " bince the 
missionary is hurr.an, the chances are that he, too, 
will tend to think and to evaluate other cultures 
against his background ana with the unspoken 
assumption that whatever is not in agreement with 
his culture is somehow suspect . 450 
American missionaries have educated the Africans 
in their schools, taught them the precepts of the Bible, 
447Painter, QQ . cit . , p . 1337 . 
44$Ibid . 449rbid . 
450Lindsell, ££· cit . , p . 278. 
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and then have been highly surprised ana indignant when 
their pupils have asked them to practice tne simple gospel. 
'lhey, too, recognize the veneer of culture over American 
mission enterprises .451 
There is no question but that missions have contrib-
uted to the moaern situation in Africa . They have made 
contrioutions in all the fields of endeavor, and they have 
raised the African ' s view of himself, allowing him to walk 
with priae in the world .452 The tragedy is that they 
failed to recognize what was essential Christianity and 
what was merely cultural . 
The resul~ has been to create a generation of Africans 
who are caught between two worlds, belonging somehow to both, 
but really to neither . 453 The consequence is that the 
moaern African is intent upon taking that which is obviously 
valuable in the gospel and harmonizing it with the evident 
values inherent in the culture that spawned him . Painter 
gives a reasonable solution to the problem of future 
missions in iast Africa: 
451Painter, Q£ · cit . , p . l))b . 
452R.obert Ezra Park, nlviissions and the f•loaern \~orld," 
Americ~ Journal of ~ociology, 50:177-78, November, 1944 . 
453Branislaw I• .. alinowski, "Pan- African Problem of 
Culture Contact," American Journal of ::>ociology, 48:o49, 
Iv1ay, 1943 • 
Kingdom building in Kenya calls for prophets 
and Christian statesmen . The leadership of the 
emerging church must be African and not Western . 
The Churches of the West can help train leaders 
who will not be hampered by denominational pre-
judices ana practices . A living Church in 
Kenya must be set in the natural social land-
scape of indigenous African culture .454 
454Painter, ££· cit . , p . 1338 . 
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CHAP'1Eh VII 
Sll1-1l•..AhY AND Cui\CLUSION 
African nationalism received much of its impetus 
and inspiration from Negro leaders in the United ~tates . 
The first organized efforts to project the African goals 
were made by American Negroes . Led by Negro agitators, 
who insisted that their race retain its distinctive cul-
ture ana comn1unity feeling, the movement gained momentum 
slowly, culminating in tne 194> Pan- African Congress in 
Manchester , ~ngland . Basil uavidson asserts : 
In this respect the sixth congress, hela at 
kanchester in 1945, was crucial . here for the 
first time the Old Guard from over the ocean 
was flanked by new men from the continent 
itself; obscure young men, ~·or the most part, 
whom few in England (or anywhere else) had 
ever heard of-- among them Kenyatta from Kenya , 
Nkr~1ah from the Gold Coast, Akintola from 
Nigeria , Johnson from Sierra Leone . 455 
Official attitudes in the United 0tates respected 
the jurisaiction of the European nations and shrank from 
any direct involvement with African aspirations . ~uch 
policies continued until it became evident that the newly 
inaepenaent nations were capable of exerting sufficient 
455basil Davidson, ~Jhich \4/ay Africa'! (Harmoncisworth, 
inglana : Penguin Books , l9G4), p . b3 . 
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pressure to preserve their sovereignty, and were capable 
of competing in the technical world of the twentieth 
century . 
'l'he official change of attitude was signaled by the 
creation, in 1957, of the African Bureau in the Department 
of State . '!'he action was commentea upon by the Council 
on Foreign Relations in the following manner: 
The establishment within the State Depart-
ment during the year of a special Bureau of 
African Affairs, headed by an Assistant 
Secretary of ~tate, testified to the realiza-
tion of Congress and tt1e executive that African 
matters could no longer be handled, as in the 
past, as an adjunct of ~uropean or Near ~astern 
policy . 456 
United ~tates interest in Africa has been to main-
tain the availability of the raw materials of the conti-
nent for v~estern productive capacity, while keeping the 
African nations stable and viable as political and 
economic units .457 
'!'his interest has been both selfish and philan-
thropic . It has sought to gain markets for proauctive 
capacity, maintain the flow of raw materials, and keep 
45 6hichard P . btebbins (ed . j, The United b~ates in 
\·Jorld Affairs, ~ (l'llew York : Harper ana Brothers, l959J, 
p . ZbO . 
457Harola G. Vatter, The U. s . Economy in the l950 1 s 
(N ew York:~·~ . w'l . Norton and Company, l9b3), p . 258 . 
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the Africans amenable to the United ~tates ' foreign policy . 
Yet, it has also been deeply interested in the well-being 
of the African states . Public opinion has been especially 
sensitive to the latter . 
Problems have always existed in the relations 
between the African states and the United States . ~ast 
Africa has been especially sensitive to the ebb and flow 
of American policy, aware of the existence of po\ver and 
the relationship between power and the independence of 
states . IJlainly , differences that have arisen between the 
~ast African states and the United ~tates have been the 
result of varying patterns of thought and basic 
philosophies . However, some tense relations have developed 
out of the selfish motives of both parties . 
The United States has had a large economic interest 
in Africa for many years . But, the advent of the atomic 
age gave them an even greater interest in the stability 
and friendliness of the new African states . ~ven where 
the investment remained small, in relation to the total 
wealth of the United States, the relative size of the 
investment within the countries has given them a control 
of the economic affairs of the states . 
Government aid has also tendea to transfer control 
of the economies to the United States, by way of giving 
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security for loans and investments . While the United 
btates may not exercise direct governmental control, 
effective control of some countries is maintained through 
economic manipulations . 
Bast Africans are biased toward the west because of 
t.heir long association with the British . They find it diffi -
cult to exchange connections, that have been made for nearly 
a century, for others that are tenuous ana to be made with 
strange people . 458 
Those connections are more extensive than the govern-
mental ana economic connections which have characterized 
their modern history . They extend to fielas sucn as 
education, religion , and other causal forces . 'l'hese cannot 
be shed easily, since they condition all that the new 
countries are, or wish to become . 
The West has contributed to the nature of modern 
East Africa . It has provided the institutions which 
characterize their modern governments . It has provided 
t he impetus for their growth of national feeling, repre-
sented by the history of the United ~tates . It has 
458Julius K. Nyerere, n'l'he Costs of Non- Alignment, 11 
Africa Heport, Vol . 11, 7:ob, Octooer, l9bb . 
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contributed the form and substance of modern education in 
~ast Africa, as well as the reasons for giving ana acquir-
ing an education . It has given to Africa the leavening 
effect of the Christian Church. Although the motives and 
results may not always have met the high standards of 
Christian ethics,459 all that modern ~ast Africa is has 
been influenced by the Christian Church. 
To summarize , it may be said that the policies of 
the United States have been dually prompted . 'l'he govern-
ment has been motivated by pragmatic considerations, taking 
into account relations with all the rest of the world. 
Privately , ana this has affected to some extent the 
official policy, the United States citizen has been 
motivated by idealism in his relations with the African 
states . The result has been, at times, an equivocal 
position . Yet, it seems that the two have been able to 
so modify each other that neither has entirely pre-
vailed . ~o the United 5tates has been able to maintain 
the \•estern influence in Africa and at the same time it 
has been able to effectively use the basic iaealism 
inherent in this country . 
459'l'om J . lviboya , Freedom and After (London : Andre 
Deutsch, Limited , l9b3), p . 19 . 
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THE UNITED .:>TAT.t:;b AND AFRICAN NA'l'IONALISIVI 
IN blH'l'lSH EAST AFRICA 
SINCE 1945 
World War II brought about a realignment of the 
power structure among the nations of the world . 'l'he primary 
conflict of interest developed between Russia and the ~lest­
ern nations, with the United btates predominant among them. 
Through the leverage afforded by the ~ast-West con-
flict, African nations were able to exert enough force to 
dislodge the colonial powers which had ruled them for 
nearly a century . 
harly efforts to unite the African people were 
carried out in the United btates and other w·festern nations, 
with American Negroes leading the drive . Among these men 
were W. E. B. DuBois and I~~arcus Garvey . 
The United States conducted its foreign policy, with 
regard to Africa, through the European capitols which 
controlled the African areas of interest . This policy con-
tinued until 1957, when it became evident that the African 
states would indeed achieve independence . In that year, 
the African Bureau was created in the Department of State . 
Economic policy was central in all the policy con-
siderations in the post-war period. Europe had to be 
rebuilt and made strong, in order to resist the push of 
Russia in the East. But, in giving aid to Europe, the 
United States stood to gain a large export trade in every 
segment of the economy. The rising capabilities of the 
rest of the world created markets for the production of 
goods in the United ~tates. 
haw materials were of vital importance. In Africa 
the United States sought to protect the precious store of 
fissionable material, which included the major portion of 
the American supply. 
East Africa was important because of its supplies 
of industrial diamonds, exotic metals, and its strategic 
communications potential if war should come with Russia. 
The United States contributed to African progress 
toward independence in many ways, including the revolu-
tionary tradition of the country, the expressed idealism 
of its citizenry, educational work, and religious 
enterprises. 
The revolutionary tradition of the United States 
gave incentive to the Africans, who felt that there was 
a kinship between them because of the common revolt 
against Britain . American leaders tended to encourage 
such an identification through their numerous idealistic 
statements advocating self-determination and other aspira-
tions. 
Educational contributions were made through the 
American universities which gave scholarships to Africans 
who could qualify and raise money for travel and through 
the efforts of many sacrificing people who worked within 
the East African countries . These latter were chiefly 
missionaries , although there were others, who were 
supported by agencies in the United States . 
l•1issions aided the progress of .l!.ast Africa by 
preaching the essential idealism of the Christian Gospel. 
The Africans coula not be satisfied with their status of 
subjugation after they had heard the tenets of the 
Christian Church . 
United ~tates policies ana involvements have been 
dually motivated . On the one hand, they have been moved 
by a genuine idealism, which is inherent in the American 
system . On the other hand, the foreign policy has been 
directed toward the preservation of the status guo in 
world politics and economy since that status gives the 
United ~tates an advantage in international politics 
and trade. 
